Friday, March 29, 2024

Federal Question Jurisdiction: A Primer

To save class time, here is what I usually lecture on in a portion in class; you can read and take notes here. Review this prior to class on Thursday (Section A) and Friday (Section B), as it will be helpful in understanding  Supplemental Jurisdiction. , as well as looking at the assigned (and linked) statutes.

Read this in conjunction with the assigned (and linked) statutes; you can supplement this with Glannon pp. 25-30, which gives a nice basic overview.

We cover Federal Question Jurisdiction in great depth in Federal Courts, an upper-level class that I encourage you to take during the next two years.

Yes, you are responsible for knowing this and it is fair game for the exam.

For Wednesday

Thursday audio--Section A I, Section A II; Section B I, Section B II. Essay # 5 due beginning of class Thursday. Essay # 6 will be posted on Friday of next week. I will post the primer on federal question jurisdiction in a few moments. Review that, although we hit the basics in class today.

Prep the rest of Supplemental Jurisdiction.

     • What is the connection between § 1367(a)'s standard and the standard for joinder in FRCP 13(a), (b), and (g); 14, and 20? There are 3 logical possibilities--what are they and which does Jones adopt? What does that mean for the counterclaim in Jones? What about the counterclaim in Kinsmann?

    • Recall the old (fictional) contract claim between VOA and BSO. Can it be joined under the rules? Is there jurisdiction?

    • Does § 1367(b) apply in Godin? What are the "jurisdictional requirements" of § 1332?

    • § 1367(b) identifies 3 categories of cases to which supplemental jurisdiction does not apply. What do they have in common? Does § 1367(b) limit supplemental jurisdictional in the following?

        • A (FL) sues X (CA) and Y (CA). X files a cross claim against Y. Y impleads its insurer (CA).

    • Consider whether, in light of the language of § 1367(b), there can be supplemental jurisdiction in the following. (See also the discussion in Glannon on this, especially as to the amount in controversy).

        • A (NY) v. X (NJ) & Y (NY). Can there be diversity over the claim v. X and supplemental over the claim v. Y?

        • A (IA) v. X (NE). X (NE) impleads M (IA). Can A bring a claim against M and get supplemental jurisdiction?

        • A (NJ) & B (DE) v. Walmart (DE/AR). Can there be diversity over A's claim and supplemental over B's?

Then move to Removal. Read the assigned statutes (§§ 1441, 1446, and 1447) and map out the process for removal. What is the effect of filing a notice of removal? What is not required for a defendant to remove? What happens then?

    • A, Inc. (IL/IL) sues X, Inc. (PA/PA) in state court in Pennsylvania. The day after filing, A's attorney calls X's attorney and asks it to waive service; X's lawyer declines. The next day X removes to federal court. Under § 1441(b)(2), is removal proper?

Thursday, March 28, 2024

For Friday (Double Session)

Thursday audio--Section A, Section B. Essay # 5 posted at noon (it erroneously went up for a bit this morning, then went back up at the scheduled time) and due next Thursday. I would remind everyone to read all the assigned materials in that section, even stuff we did not discuss in class, to get a full understanding of how summary judgment works.

CivProachella tomorrow. I know many people will be attending a 3 p.m. Mass for Good Friday. The class will be audio-recorded, as always.

We will finish Diversity Jurisdiction, so read and/or review all pieces of that. What are Mrs. Mas' possible domiciles and where did the court land as to her citizenship and why?

  • Consider the bases for jurisdiction of the following:

        • A (PR) v. X (DC) 

        • A (Cuba) v. X (FL)

        • A (Cuba) v. X (Venezuela)

        • A (TX) & B (China) v. X (Taiwan)

        • A (TX) & B (FL) v. X (Taiwan) & Y (FL)

        • A (Cuba/Lawful permanent resident domiciled in FL) v. X (FL)

        • A (NY) v. X (US Citizen domiciled in France) 

    • How do you determine domicile for corporations? What about for non-corporate business entities? What is the significance of entities having (potentially) multiple domiciles? Is there diversity jurisdiction in Morgan? What about in VOA?

    • What happens if adverse parties are entities with multiple citizenships? Consider whether there is jurisdiction (and on what bases) in the following cases:

        • A, Inc (DE/DE) v. X, Ltd. (NJ/Canada)

        • A LLC (NY/Mexico) v. X, Ltd. (NJ/Canada)

    • What is the purpose of the amount-in-controversy requirement? How do you determine if it is satisfied? What if the case seeks equitable relief (such as specific performance or an injunction)?

    • Plaintiff files in state court and wants to make clear the case cannot be filed in federal court because of the amount-in-controversy, by dramatically being .01 below the threshold. The complaint states "The amount in controversy is $ 74,999.99 and not one cent more." What did the lawyer do wrong, if the goal was to be .01 below?

We move to Supplemental Jurisdiction, which involves § 1367, an unfortunately confusing statute. For tomorrow, prep § 1367(a) and (c); FRCP 18 and 82; and Glannon pp. 253-61 and 267-70. Consider whether there is supplemental jurisdiction in VOA and in Godin and why. Consider whether there is supplemental jurisdiction over Winston's counterclaims and why. What might cause the court to decline jurisdiction under (c)? When should the parties and court rely on § 1367(a) and how does that show problems with VOA's complaint? Why is it preferable to establish diversity jurisdiction rather than rely on § 1367?

    • What is the connection between § 1367(a)'s standard and the joinder rules of FRCP 13, 14, and 20?

    Ford says § 1367(a) reaches the limits of Article III. What does that mean?

    • Recall the old (fictional) contract claim between VOA and BSO. Can it be joined under the rules? Is there jurisdiction?

Essay # 5: Kieran Ravi Bhattacharya v. James B. Murray, et al.

Kieran Ravi Bhattacharya v. James B. Murray, et al.

 

Kieran Ravi Bhattacharya (“Bhattacharya”) sues numerous officials at the University of Virginia and the University of Virginia School of Medicine (collectively, “UVa”), arising from his suspension from medical school; he claims the school suspended him in retaliation for his protected speech, in violation of the First Amendment.

 

UVa moves for summary judgment as to the suspension from school. It concedes that plaintiff engaged in protected First Amendment activity in asking questions during an academic panel.

 

Section A: For Defendants, argue in support of the motion.

 

Section B: For Plaintiff, argue in opposition to the motion.

 

The legal and factual record is after the jump.

Wednesday, March 27, 2024

Makeup Classes, Friday, March 29

You all have seen the email from Prof. Carpenter regarding your pre-makeup classes for Criminal Law. Therefore our schedule for this Friday, March 29 will be as follows:

10 a.m.-11:10 a.m.: Section A (regular class)

11:30 a.m.-12:40 p.m.: Section A (makeup)

1 p.m.-2:10 p.m.: Section B (regular class)

2:30 p.m.-3:40 p.m.: Section B (makeup)

We will still add 10 minutes to our Friday classes on April 5, 12, and 19. That will bring us to even.

For Thursday

Wednesday audio--Section A, Section B. Essay # 5 will post at noon tomorrow and will be due in class on Thursday, April 4.

One final point on Summary Judgment: There is a third, rarer situation in which it might be "beyond peradventure" that a movant with the burden of persuasion and initial burden of production is entitled to summary judgment: When the movant presents overwhelming evidence from the nonmovant and the nonmovant's witnesses, such that the nonmovant cannot attack or undermine its own evidence. We saw this in Dominion v. Fox News, a defamation action over statements about Dominion voting machines and the 2020 election; the case settled for $ 768 million. Dominion sought and won summary judgment because emails and text messages from Fox employees and on-air personalities and the deposition testimony of those officials showed they knew their statements were false; Fox could not counter evidence from its own witnesses. Again, this is fairly rare.

We continue with Diversity Jurisdiction; prep the entire section, which will take us through our (some form of) double session on Friday. Review your notes (from the second day of the semester) on the basic structure of the federal judiciary and the difference between exclusive jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction.

    • What is the constitutional structure of the federal judiciary? What does Article III tell us about the jurisdiction of the federal courts? What doesn't it tell us about the jurisdiction of the federal courts? What is the connection between Article III and the various statutes, such as § 1331 and § 1332?

    What is the purpose or rationale behind diversity jurisdiction?

    • A(FL) sues X (NY) in federal court in Louisiana; is there subject matter jurisdiction?

    • What is complete diversity and minimal diversity? What is required, by what source of law, and why? How does that requirement relate to the purposes of diversity jurisdiction? What is the argument in favor of minimal diversity and what are the problems with that argument, given the purposes of diversity jurisdiction?

    • What is the statutory basis for jurisdiction in Mas and why? Why is it necessary to consider the citizenship of Mr. and Mrs. Mas?

    • Consider whether there is complete, minimal, or no diversity in the following:

        • A (FL) v X (FL)

        • A (FL) v. X (NY)

        • A (FL) v. X (NY) & Y (FL)

        • A (CA) v. X (NY) & Y (MN)

        • A (NY) & B (FL) v. X (NJ) & Y (FL)

        • A (NY) & B (FL) v. X (NJ) & Y (IL)

        • A (NY) & B (NY) v. X (CA) & Y (CA)

        • A (NY) v. Audi (Ger) & VWA (NJ) & WorldWide (NY) & Seaway (NY)

    • What is domicile? What is change of domicile? What facts and evidence can parties use to prove domicile? 

    • Consider the bases for jurisdiction of the following:

        • A (PR) v. X (DC) 

        • A (Cuba) v. X (FL)

        • A (Cuba) v. X (Venezuela)

        • A (TX) & B (China) v. X (Taiwan)

        • A (TX) & B (FL) v. X (Taiwan) & Y (FL)

        • A (Cuba/Lawful permanent resident domiciled in FL) v. X (FL)

        • A (NY) v. X (US Citizen domiciled in France)

Sample Answer--Essay # 3

Section A: Median: 14; Mean: 15.2

Section B: Median: 15; Mean: 17

A couple of general reminders about common problems that have come up on all 3 essays; I addressed these in the instructions for the essays and in the blog posts on good writing, but they bear repeating (and the prior explanations bear review):

    • Know the role the question asks you to play. If you are the judge deciding a motion, don't say "The court should grant the motion." You're the court--grant it or deny it.

    • I don't require you to find the original cases and provide full citations. In fact, the instructions make very clear that you should not be looking at anything other than the essay prompt and class materials. You should not be going online for anything, even to find a full citation for a case--since you don't need to provide citations at all.

    • Think about how you organize your rule/explanation where you have a rule with multiple possible independent factors, such as the Foman reasons. Is it better to list and explain all 6 reasons, then go back and apply each? Or is it better to explain and apply one ground, then move on to the next? Which makes it easier for a reader to see and understand your rule/application?

    • On that note: If you do not have facts that could support some of those reasons, no need to give equal space to all.

    • You were asked to decide a motion for leave to amend. FRCP 15(a)(1) is irrelevant to anything in the case. Regardless of whether the party could have amended as a matter of course, by moving he necessarily asked the court for permission and therefore must satisfy 15(a)(2) and Foman. In other words, there was no reason to analyze or even discuss the 15(a)(1) time periods at all.

    • Similarly, no facts indicated the amendment was filed after the limitations period had run. So there was no need to discuss relation back.

    • You do not have write to the full 1000 words. But I try to make each essay substantial enough that a good anser will come close to that. It is unlikely anyone is such a concise writer that he could do a thorough and complete analysis in 700 words.

Friday, March 22, 2024

For Wednesday

Friday audio--Section A, Section B. Essay # 4 due at the beginning of class Wednesday. We will finish Summary Judgment on Wednesday, so Essay # 5 will be posted at noon on Thursday, March 28 and due on Thursday, April 4.

We pick up with Salazar-Limon. The evidence described in the record is complete; it reflects what both parties submitted in support and opposition to the motion. (Note that moving here used both 56(c)(1)(A) in offering his own testimony and 56(c)(1)(B) in pointing to the insufficiency of plaintiff's evidence). Accepting there is no dispute as to whether π was reaching for his waistband, how can plaintiff argue there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact. We also will discuss the problems in Glannon pp.408, 409, and 417.

    • The law recognizes "mixed-motive" employment discrimination cases--where the defendant took an adverse employment action based on permissible and impermissible grounds. The plaintiff must prove the impermissible grounds were the "but-for" cause--the employer would not have made the adverse decision without the impermissible reason. Courts adopt a burden-shifting framework in such cases (here is your example in which the substantive law declares that the burden of production shifts): The plaintiff offers evidence that the defendant acted for an impermissible reason; the burden of production shifts to the defendant to offer evidence that it would have made the same decision based solely on permissible grounds.

            Recall our hypothetical of the African American non-attorney denied a job as an attorney because he is African American and he is not an attorney. Consider how the plaintiff and defendant could move for summary judgment in this case and what each must do to support the motion.

    • What can a non-moving party do if it needs more time to gather evidence to oppose a summary judgment motion?

    • Review the Seventh Amendment; we will consider whether summary judgment is a valid procedure, as a conceptual matter and as the courts apply it.

We then move to Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Overview and the beginning of Diversity Jurisdiction. Prep all of Overview, in addition to FRCP 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3), and § 1332(a).

    • When does each party consider whether the case is in the correct forum?

    • How does each party (the plaintiff filing in federal court and the defendant sued in federal court) present issues about subject matter jurisdiction to the Court?

    • What is the constitutional structure of the federal judiciary? What does Article III tell us about the jurisdiction of the federal courts? What doesn't it tell us about the jurisdiction of the federal courts? What is the connection between Article III and the various statutes, such as § 1331 and § 1332?

    What is the purpose or rationale behind diversity jurisdiction?

Thursday, March 21, 2024

For Friday

Thursday audio--Section A, Section B.

We continue Summary Judgment; I expect we can finish this next Wednesday. Make sure to read pp. 57-59 in Nunes v. Lizza; it offers nice synthesis of the summary judgment standard, incorporating the pieces we have discussed so far. Be ready to discuss the problems from Glannon p. 408, 409, and 417. Consider:

    • How much evidence must the party offer to create a genuine dispute? How much uncertainty about the fact must there be?

    • What form will the evidence take when presented to support and oppose a motion? What evidence did Mrs. Catrett offer and what were the problems with it?

    • Can the Non-Movant oppose summary judgment based on the possibility of disbelief of the Movant's evidence? In Adickes, had the officer denied presence, could Adickes oppose summary judgment by arguing the jury might disbelieve the officer?

    • What is required for a valid affidavit? Does it matter that the affidavit is self-serving? What should the court do if one person's affidavit and deposition diverge. Imagine:

            Adickes Deposition: The student told me the officer was in the store. I didn't see anyone.

            Adickes Affidavit: I saw the officer in the store.

    How does substantive law affect the summary judgment analysis? What if substantive law requires clear-and-convincing evidence? What if, in Adickes, the plaintiff produces evidence of presence but not of communication or agreement--make the argument for defendant on summary judgment.

    • Imagine the Court in Scott adopted a per se Fourth Amendment rule: A person fleeing police at high speeds is per se an imminent threat. How does that affect summary judgment in that case? How does it affect the argument that the video is not one-sided? (Watch the video, available in the Additional Materials Post).

 Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston:

    Salazar-Limon sues the City of Houston on a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim arising from an officer shooting him during a traffic stop. Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer's use of force is justified if he reasonably feared an imminent threat to his life or safety. Courts have held that an officer can infer an imminent threat if a suspect reaches for his waistband.

    Defendant moves for summary judgment. Argue both sides.

    The record shows the following:

        Undisputed Facts:

                • Plaintiff was shot in the back

                • Plaintiff did not have a gun.

        Plaintiff Deposition:

            I was walking away from the officer. He shot me immediately after or within seconds of commanding me to stop. I did not turn or have a chance to turn before I was shot; the shot came right after the command. I did not have anything in my waistband.

        Officer Deposition:

            The suspect raised his hands as if he were reaching for his waistband. I shot after he made the motion with his hands towards his waistband.

Wednesday, March 20, 2024

Essay # 4 (Updated)

Essay # 4: Norma Davis v. Disability Rights New Jersey

 

Disability Rights New Jersey (“DRNJ”), an advocacy group, fired Norma Davis as a senior staff attorney in January 2020. Davis files an action under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (the state employment-discrimination law); the complaint alleges defendants, through the discriminatory firing, “have caused plaintiff to suffer personal hardships, including economic loss, physical and emotional distress, anxiety, pain and suffering, humiliation, and career, family, and social disruption.”

 

The case proceeds to discovery.

 

Defendant’s First Set of Interrogatories:

   * * *

   7.   Identify the nature of plaintiff’s emotional injuries.

 

 

Plaintiff’s Reponses to Defendant’s First Set of Interrogatories

 

   7.   I suffer from ongoing emotional distress due to defendants’ discrimination, which has led to physical manifestations, including terrible migraines, insomnia, worsening of her diabetes, and worsening blood pressure.

 

Defendant’s Request for Production of Documents

 

   1.    Provide copies or links to all social media postings, profiles and comments from January 1, 2020 to the present, regarding any of the following:

      • Disability Rights New Jersey, its executive director Gwen Orlowski, and general counsel Ellen Catanese

      • The allegations of the current lawsuit

      • Posts that express an emotion, sentiment, or feeling, excluding opinions about politics and posts saying “happy birthday”

      • Posts discussing or mentioning vacations, trips, parties, or celebrations

      • Posts discussion or mentioning illness or worries about illness

      • Posts that mention work

      • Posts containing pictures of plaintiff

 

Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Request for Production of Documents

 

   1.   Plaintiff objects to Request # 1, as it is overbroad, is not described with reasonable particularity, seeks protected private information, is not relevant, and is unduly burdensome and costly in light of what is sought.

 

 

 

Davis files a Motion for a Protective Order; DRNJ files a Cross Motion to Compel Production.

 

For DRNJ, argue that the Motion to Compel should be granted and the Motion for a Protective Order should be denied, including the role of any prospective confidentiality order.

For Thursday

Wednesday audio--Section A, Section B. Essay # 4 posted at noon; due next Wednesday.

We continue with Standards and Procedures (which is the same reading as Carrying the Burden of Production). Be sure to review FRCP 50.

    • What is the burden of production?

    • How do FRCP 50 and 56 relate to one another, according to Celotex?

    • What was wrong with the affidavits in Adickes? How could they have been corrected?

    • Can you reconcile Adickes and Celotex in terms of what the movant must do to support a summary judgment motion? What would have happened, on the evidence the plaintiff had, if Adickes had gone to trial? What does Justice White's concurrence in Celotex add to this?

    • Imagine the plaintiff in Adickes opposing summary judgment via the Celotex method. What could the defendant ask for in discovery, how could plaintiff respond, and how could summary judgment proceed?

    • What makes a dispute genuine? How genuine must it be? How much uncertainty can there be about a fact to be in dispute?

    • What form must the evidence be on summary judgment? What evidence did Mrs. Catrett have in Celotex

Something else to consider: What is the argument that Scott was wrongly decided because the Court's approach to video was wrong?

Pleading and NRA v. Vullo

Here is the audio and transcript of Monday's SCOTUS argument in NRA v. Vullo. The NRA brought a First Amendment suit, alleging that New York State coerced banks and insurance companies to stop doing business with the organization, in retaliation for its pro-gun speech. Listen to/read the Respondent's argument, which is all about Twiqbal, including the role for "obvious alternative explanation" in certain suits against the government.

Friday, March 15, 2024

For Wednesday

Friday audio--Section A, Section B. Essay # 4 posts at noon next Wednesday; Essay # 3 due at the beginning of class Wednesday.

Someone made a good point after class: The 26(f) conference, discovery plan, and initial Rule 16 conference may streamline this process. The parties would identify the dispute over the formulae during the conference, flag the dispute as part of the discovery plan, and address it with the court at a conference, probably through cross-motions. That gets us to the point we reached--the parties present the dispute to the court, the court decides the formula is discoverable and orders production, Coca Cola resists (loudly) the order, and the court imposes sanctions. It skips the intermediate steps of Bottler having to make requests and Coca Cola having to object to set-up the motions. This reflects FRCP 26(f) streamlining the process--as it is designed to do. By the way, I have done this problem with a room full of lawyers--and no one identified that idea.

We move to Summary Judgment: Standards and Procedures. Prep everything assigned.

    • What is the connection between discovery and summary judgment?

    • How does summary judgment differ from 12(b)(6) and 12(c)? What will the court consider on a motion for summary judgment? What is a stipulation?

    • What is an affidavit or declaration (and how are they different)? How else can a party preview a witness' testimony besides an affidavit or declaration? What is the difference and when will the party choose one or the other?

    • Break down the elements of FRCP 26(a) and the meaning of each key term. Think of how these terms apply in Scott, Adickes, and Celotex. How does the court decide each of these terms without acting as factfinder?

    • What is direct evidence? What is circumstantial evidence?

    • What is the burden of persuasion? What is the burden of production?

Note that Salazar-Limon is not a case to read but another problem that I will give you on the blog.

Thursday, March 14, 2024

For Friday

Thursday audio--Section A, Section B. My apologies for those of you in Section A who had LSV at 11:20; I did not realize we were running into class time.

We will have a few final words on sanctions. We know the goal is the minimum sanction to ensure compliance. What fact(s) should the court consider in figuring out what that is (hint: they were all things that some of you mentioned). On the question of available sanctions, see FRCP 37(b)(2)(B) for sanctions for violating FRCP 35 and FRCP 45(g) for sanctions for violating a subpoena. Why the unique treatment of contempt in both of those?

We then get to Coca Cola. Remember, one person can only speak 3 times. So everyone on each side must be ready to participate or this will come to a screeching halt. I reserve the right to cold-call.

Both sections: One person can speak no more than three times in working the problem; that means I expect everyone to participate in this discussion. I reserve the right to cold call.

    Coca Cola Bottling Co. (Bottling) contracts with Coca Cola Co. (Coca) to bottle Coca Cola. Coca sends pre-mixed syrup to the bottler; the bottler mixes the syrup with carbonated water, bottles it, and ships it. The contract sets a price at which Bottler purchases syrup for "Coca Cola." The formula for Coca Cola is among the best-kept trade secrets in American business, particularly the composition of the mystery ingredient known as "Merchandise 7X." Two  people in the company at any time know the forumla for Merchandise 7X. The written formula is locked in a bank vault that can be opened only on resolution of the company Board of Directors (which requires a meeting and a vote, which takes some time but is not burdensome).

    Coca introduces "New Coke" and "Diet Coke" as new products. The secret ingredient in those products is "7X-100." As with 7X, two people in the company know the 7X-100 formula, the written formula is locked in a vault and opening the vault requires a resolution of the Board of Directors. Coca sells the syrup for New Coke and Diet Coke to Bottler, but at a substantially higher price than the contract price.

    Bottler sues Coca for breach of contract, arguing that Coca must sell New Coke and Diet Coke syrup at the contract price for Coca Cola. Bottler seeks to obtain discovery of the formulae for Merchandise 7X and 7X-100; Coca does not want to turn this information over.

    Be prepared to litigate for both sides:

        • Was Coca required to disclose under 26(a)?

        • How can Bottler seek the formula and how can Coca resist?

        • Must the formulae be provided and on what terms? What can either party do if it disagrees with that resolution?

        • What can Coca do if the court orders it to provide the formulae? What can the court do in response? What choices does Coca have?

 I hope to at least begin Summary Judgment: Standards and Procedures. For tomorrow, review FRCP 56(a), (b), and (c), along with FRCP 12(d).

    • What is the connection between discovery and summary judgment?

    • How does summary judgment differ from 12(b)(6) and 12(c)? What will the court consider on a motion for summary judgment? What is a stipulation?

    • What is an affidavit or declaration (and how are they different)? How else can a party preview a witness' testimony besides an affidavit or declaration? What is the difference and when will the party choose one or the other?

Wednesday, March 13, 2024

For Thursday

Wednesday audio--Section A, Section B. Essay # 3 posted at noon today.

We continue with both sections in Discovery; please review assigned rules.

   • Where does the obligation for parties to comply with discovery rules come from? What about non-parties?

    • What is the process for seeking, obtaining, and responding to discovery?

    • When and how does the court become involved?

    • How does the court ensure compliance with discovery obligations when it becomes involved?

Discovery Review will involve Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca Cola Co. You should be able to prepare for it for tomorrow. In Section A, the side of the room closest to the door represents the Bottler; the other side represents Coca Cola.

Both sections: One person can speak no more than three times in working the problem; that means I expect everyone to participate in this discussion. I reserve the right to cold call.

    Coca Cola Bottling Co. (Bottling) contracts with Coca Cola Co. (Coca) to bottle Coca Cola. Coca sends pre-mixed syrup to the bottler; the bottler mixes the syrup with carbonated water, bottles it, and ships it. The contract sets a price at which Bottler purchases syrup for "Coca Cola." The formula for Coca Cola is among the best-kept trade secrets in American business, particularly the composition of the mystery ingredient known as "Merchandise 7X." Two  people in the company at any time know the forumla for Merchandise 7X. The written formula is locked in a bank vault that can be opened only on resolution of the company Board of Directors (which requires a meeting and a vote, which takes some time but is not burdensome).

    Coca introduces "New Coke" and "Diet Coke" as new products. The secret ingredient in those products is "7X-100." As with 7X, two people in the company know the 7X-100 formula, the written formula is locked in a vault and opening the vault requires a resolution of the Board of Directors. Coca sells the syrup for New Coke and Diet Coke to Bottler, but at a substantially higher price than the contract price.

    Bottler sues Coca for breach of contract, arguing that Coca must sell New Coke and Diet Coke syrup at the contract price for Coca Cola. Bottler seeks to obtain discovery of the formulae for Merchandise 7X and 7X-100; Coca does not want to turn this information over.

    Be prepared to litigate for both sides:

        • Was Coca required to disclose under 26(a)?

        • How can Bottler seek the formula and how can Coca resist?

        • Must the formulae be provided and on what terms?

        • What can Coca do if the court orders it to provide it? What can the court do in response?

 

Essay # 3

COLLEGE REPUBLICANS   )

OF STATE UNIVERSITY       )

OF NEW YORK-                     )

BINGHAMTON,                      )

               Plaintiff                      )

      v.                                         )

BRIAN ROSE, IN HIS             )

OFFICIAL CAPACITY            )

AS VICE PRESIDENT FOR    )

STUDENT AFFAIRS AT          )

SUNY-BINGHAMTON, and    )

IN HISINDIVIDUAL               )

CAPACITY, et al.                      )

            Defendants                     )

 

 

* * *

 

Count I: Violation of First Amendment

(v. Brian Rose in his Official Capacity)

 

* * *

 

Count II: Violation of First Amendment

(v. Brian Rose in his Individual Capacity)

 

 

 

The claims arise from two incidents at the State University of New York (SUNY)-Binghamton, in which ideologically adverse campus groups disrupted the College Republicans’ expressive events and university officials failed to protect the group’s speech. The first was a “tabling” event on November 14, 2021 promoting an upcoming lecture by renowned economist and president adviser Dr. Arthur Laffer (“Tabling Event”). The second was Dr. Laffer’s lecture days later (“Laffer Event”), which ended after fifteen minutes when protesters prevented Laffer from being heard and he left the stage. Plaintiff alleges that Rose (and other university officials named as defendants, who are not important for present purposes) allowed the events to be interrupted; did nothing to protect plaintiff from the disrupting crowd or to ensure its expressive events could continue; encouraged the disruptions; and pushed the Republicans and their invited speaker to end both events.

 

Rose moves to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6). The court issues the following order:

 

      1) Rose Motion to Dismiss Count I--the official-capacity claim--is DENIED; Count I may proceed. College Republicans of Binghamton sufficiently pleaded that its First Amendment rights were violated because university officials failed to stop disruption of the Tabling Event and disruption of the Laffer Event and failed to protect plaintiff in the exercise of its First Amendment rights. The complaint sufficiently pleads an ongoing violation and a risk of future violations of plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by Rose in his official capacity.

      2) Rose Motion to Dismiss Count II--the individual-capacity claim--is GRANTED; Count II is DISMISSED. As described above, plaintiff sufficiently pleaded that its First Amendment were violated by the disruption of the two events; that fconclusion applies to the individual-capacity claim and the official-capacity claim. (See Order ¶ 1). But to hold a government-official defendant personally liable in an individual capacity for damages, plaintiff must plead and prove an additional element—that the government official, through that official’s own individual actions, violated the Constitution. Tangretti v. Bachmann (2d Cir. 2020). Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient nonconclusory facts about Rose’s personal actions with respect to either the Tabling Event or the Laffer Event to plausibly show Rose’s individual connection to those violations. Count II is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; plaintiff may move to amend if discovery reveals Rose’s personal involvement in the constitutional violations.

 

Rose files an Answer to the official-capacity claim (Count I).

 

A Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order provides in relevant part:

 

      1.   Discovery closes 90 days after all depositions have been taken.

 

      2.   Parties may seek leave to amend at any time until 30 days after completion of the final deposition.

 

      3.   The court does not set a date for trial at this time. The court will confer with the parties to set a trial date following the close of discovery, resolution of dispositive motions, and completion of settlement efforts.

 

 

The case proceeds to discovery. Plaintiff takes its final deposition on November 24, 2023; defendant takes its final deposition on December 30, 2023.

 

On January 15, 2024, plaintiff moves for leave to amend to add a claim for damages against Rose in his individual capacity. The motion states that documents obtained in discovery and deposition testimony from several witnesses provide new information linking Rose to the Tabling and Laffer events and thus supporting an individual-capacity claim.

 

The proposed Amended Complaint (attached to the motion) repeats all factual allegations of the original Complaint. It adds the individual-capacity claim as Court II and includes the following new allegations:

 

      52.     Rose personally traveled to the Tabling Event but chose not to intervene when protesters disrupted the event.

 

      53. To the contrary, Rose told several disruptive students and groups that he would not stop their disruptive actions so long as no one was physically injured.

 

      * * *

 

      91.     Rose told the chief of campus police to confront the speaker at the Laffer Event and to encourage him to return to his plane and cancel the event.

 

      92.     The chief of police, who reports to and is supervised by Rose in the university hierarchy, followed those instructions.

      * * *

 

      102.   Rose observed the Laffer Event from a conference room in university-police headquarters, saw the disruption occurring, but did nothing to intervene.

 

 

Rose opposes the motion for leave to amend.

 

 

For the court, decide the motion.

Tuesday, March 12, 2024

Sample Discovery Documents

Purely to demonstrate how they look and sound. We are not going to dig into these cases. Here, here, and here.

Friday, March 8, 2024

For Wednesday

Friday audio--Section A, Section B. Essay # 3 will post at noon Wednesday.

We continue on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday with Discovery. Review Discovery Process, then prep Enforcing and Avoiding Obligations, which adds FRCP 37 (all) and 45(a), (d), (e), and (g), as well as Seattle Times to the prior reading.

    • Why have the proportionality requirement in the rule? How does FRCP 26(b)(2) relate to 26(b)(1)?

    • Review the rules relating to the various discovery devices. Is there a particular order in which to use each device?

    • What is unique about FRCP 35 compared with other rules? What does Schlagenhauf tell about the scope and meaning of FRCP 35?

    • Where does the obligation for parties to comply with discovery rules come from? What about non-parties?

    • What is the process for seeking, obtaining, and responding to discovery? When and how does the court become involved? How does the court ensure compliance?

Discovery Review (probably for later Thursday or Friday) will involve Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca Cola Co. (You probably cannot fully analyze the problem until we get through Wednesday and Thursday materials, but you have it).

    Coca Cola Bottling Co. (Bottling) contracts with Coca Cola Co. (Coca) to bottle Coca Cola. Coca sends pre-mixed syrup to the bottler; the bottler mixes the syrup with carbonated water, bottles it, and ships it. The contract sets a price at which Bottler purchases syrup for "Coca Cola." The formula for Coca Cola is among the best-kept trade secrets in American business, particularly the composition of the mystery ingredient known as "Merchandise 7X." Two  people in the company at any time know the forumla for Merchandise 7X. The written formula is locked in a bank vault that can be opened only on resolution of the company Board of Directors (which requires a meeting and a vote, which takes some time but is not burdensome).

    Coca introduces "New Coke" and "Diet Coke" as new products. The secret ingredient in those products is "7X-100." As with 7X, two people in the company know the 7X-100 formula, the written formula is locked in a vault and opening the vault requires a resolution of the Board of Directors. Coca sells the syrup for New Coke and Diet Coke to Bottler, but at a substantially higher price than the contract price.

    Bottler sues Coca for breach of contract, arguing that Coca must sell New Coke and Diet Coke syrup at the contract price for Coca Cola. Bottler seeks to obtain discovery of the formulae for Merchandise 7X and 7X-100; Coca does not want to turn this information over.

    Be prepared to litigate for both sides:

        • Was Coca required to disclose under 26(a)?

        • How can Bottler seek the formula and how can Coca resist?

        • Must the formulae be provided and on what terms?

        • What can Coca do if the court orders it to provide it? What can the court do in response?

Thursday, March 7, 2024

For Friday

Thursday audio--Section A, Section B. Essay # 3 will be posted next Wednesday.

We are now done with pleading, so you should review the flow charts and put all the pieces together.

We move to Managerial Judging and Discovery: Discovery Process. For discovery, focus on the assigned pieces of FRCP 26, FRCP 30(a)-(d), 33, 34, 35, and 36, along with the Glannon reading.

    • What is managerial judging and how does FRCP 16 contribute to that? What does FRCP 16 require or allow the judge to do?

    • How does discovery square with the adversary system? How does adverseness work into discovery? How do the rules attempt to reduce adverseness?

    • Why would a party object in a deposition? How can a party protect its interests while responding to a Rule 34 document request?

    • What is the connection between discovery and notice pleading?

    • What is disclosure and what is the standard for disclosure? How is that different than the ordinary standard for what is discoverable? Why a different standard for disclosure?

    • Think about the various discovery devices (in FRCP 30-36), how they fit together, what information they provide, and a rough order in which to employ the devices.

Wednesday, March 6, 2024

For Thursday

Wednesday audio--Section A, Section B. Essay # 3 will post next Wednesday, March 13 and will be due the following Wednesday, March 20 (I understand you all have LSV papers this weekend). Many people still need to pick up Essays ## 1 and 2.

We continue with Amendments and Relation Back.

    • What is imputed or constructive notice? Key emphasis on "impute"--what does that word mean and how does that explain "imputed knowledge?" How can the to-be-added party get either actual or imputed notice? What are the timing requirements for that notice?

    • What is a "mistake concerning the proper party's identity," according to the 1966 Committee notes, Krupski, and Herrera? Why no relation back of a Doe defendant? What is the argument that Krupski allows Doe relation back?

Then move to Managerial Judging, focused on FRCP 16.

    • What is managerial judging and how does FRCP 16 contribute to that? What does FRCP 16 require or allow the judge to do?

Then we may hit the very beginning of Discovery: Discovery Process. Just for tomorrow, prep FRCP 26(f), 30, and 34.

    • How does discovery square with the adversary system? How does adverseness work into discovery?

    • Why would a party object in a deposition?

    • What is the connection between discovery and notice pleading?

Sample Answer--Essay # 2

Section A: Median: 14; Mean: 14.7

Section B: Median: 17.5; Mean: 15.6

Sample Answer--Essay # 1

Section A: Median: 23; Mean: 21.8

Section B: Median: 20; Mean: 20

Tuesday, March 5, 2024

For return from break

Sorry for the delay in posting. Here is the Section A and Section B audio from the Friday before break.

We will continue with Amendments for Wednesday and part of Thursday. No new reading until Thursday, but review the Amendments reading. Essay # 3 will likely post this Friday (March 8), due on Friday, March 15.

    • Be prepared to discuss the remaining Foman factors. What is the connection and distinction between undue delay and undue prejudice? What makes an amendment futile? How does relation back connect to futility? How can the court know that a proposed amendment is futile?

    • Consider: In Zielinski, PPI moves for leave to amend to change its answer to ¶ 5 to make clear it is not responsible for the pier. What is Zielinski's argument for undue prejudice?

    • What is the purpose of relation back and how does it operate? What are the procedural frames in which it can be raised? 

    • What are the underlying policies behind statutes of limitations? How does those policies connect to relation back?

    • Consider the elements of relation back: How is notice created? What is the timing for that notice? What is the difference between "actual notice" and "imputed or constructive notice?" How might a new party obtain either kind?

    • What is a "mistake concerning the proper party's identity?" How does it apply to a Doe pleading?