Part II of Section B audio glitched out; here is Part I. Section A--Part I, Part II. Both classes cover the same material, so everyone can use the Section A audio for both parts.
Essays ## 9 and 10 due at the start of the Monday make-up classes (11 a.m. Section B, 4 p.m. Section A). Essay # 8 outside my office.
Quick clarification on # 4: The prevailing view rests with the plaintiff--Rules 12 and 56 occupy the field and leave no room for the state law motion.
For preparation:
• Return to Puzzle # 1. What is the argument that the state disclosure law should apply? Consider the (likely) purposes behind that law--what is the legislature trying to achieve by requiring disclosure of funders?
• What is the argument for the invalidity of FRCP 15(c)(1)(B) and (C)?
Finally, here is the additional problem; this presents a question about the source of judicial analysis that matters to the § 1652 question.
Doe v. X (SD Fla).
A sues X for sexual battery. A wishes to proceed pseudonymously as "Doe," rather than including her real name in the caption of the complaint. (Her identity would be disclosed to the court and the parties--it just would not appear in the complaint). State law provides that victims of sexual torts can sue under a pseudonym; federal courts apply a multi-factor balancing test, balancing the plaintiff's reasonable fear of harm from litigating under her own name against the presumptively open nature of judicial proceedings.
What are the arguments and analysis in both directions--in favor of state law applying and against state law applying? Again, consider why the rules exist and what they seek to achieve.
