Thursday, April 2, 2026

For Friday, April 3

Thursday audio--Section A. Essays ## 7 and 8 will post next Wednesday, April 8, due Wednesday, April 15.

Prep all cases in Modern Analysis (NicastroWalden, BK), then prep General Jurisdiction Revisited. Prep the puzzles and questions ahead of time.

On the subject of Long Arm Statutes: This short article includes an appendix identifying the long-arm provision for each state, including where it appears (Constitution, statute, court rules) and whether it is an enumeration, a catch-all, or a hybrid. Nice resource to have.

In returning to Daimler, the casebook omits two footnotes that are worth highlighting, for understanding the Shoe Algorithm and how the analysis works. Both are on p.173:

FN 19 is at the end of ¶ 2, on the word State.

We do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case, see, e.g., Perkins, described supra, at 10–12, and n. 8, a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State. But this case presents no occasion to explore that question, because Daimler’s activities in California plainly do not approach that level. It is one thing to hold a corporation answerable for operations in the forum State, see infra, at 23, quite another to expose it to suit on claims having no connection whatever to the forum State. 

• FN 20 is at the end of Part IV.B, on the word California.

To clarify in light of Justice Sotomayor’s opinion concurring in the judgment, the general jurisdiction inquiry does not “focu[s] solely on the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.” Post, at 8. General jurisdiction instead calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them. Otherwise, “at home” would be synonymous with “doing business” tests framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in the United States. See von Mehren & Trautman 1142–1144. Nothing in International Shoe and its progeny suggests that “a particular quantum of local activity” should give a State authority over a “far larger quantum of . . . activity” having no connection to any in-state activity. Feder, supra, at 694.Justice Sotomayor would reach the same result, but for a different reason. Rather than concluding that Daimler is not at home in Cali- fornia, Justice Sotomayor would hold that the exercise of general jurisdiction over Daimler would be unreasonable “in the unique circumstances of this case.” Post, at 1. In other words, she favors a resolution fit for this day and case only. True, a multipronged reasonableness check was articulated in Asahi, 480 U. S., at 113–114, but not as a free-floating test. Instead, the check was to be essayed when specific jurisdiction is at issue. See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 476–478 (1985). First, a court is to determine whether the connection between the forum and the episode-in-suit could justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction. Then, in a second step, the court is to consider several additional factors to assess the reasonableness of entertaining the case. When a corporation is genuinely at home in the forum State, however, any second-step inquiry would be superfluous.Justice Sotomayor fears that our holding will “lead to greater unpredictability by radically expanding the scope of jurisdictional dis- covery.” Post, at 14. But it is hard to see why much in the way of discovery would be needed to determine where a corporation is at home. Justice Sotomayor’s proposal to import Asahi’s “reasonableness” check into the general jurisdiction determination, on the other hand, would indeed compound the jurisdictional inquiry. The reasonableness factors identified in Asahi include “the burden on the defendant,” “the interests of the forum State,” “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief,” “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,” “the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies,” and, in the international context, “the procedural and substantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction.” 480 U. S., at 113–115 (some internal quotation marks omitted). Imposing such a checklist in cases of general jurisdiction would hardly promote the efficient disposition of an issue that should be resolved expeditiously at the outset of litigation. 

Wednesday, April 1, 2026

The missing clause in 1367(b)

In class, we discussed this puzzle:

    A (NJ) + B (DE) v. X (DE)

We explained that this case is not covered by the text of § 1367(b), which does not include "claims by plaintiffs joined under Rule 20" from supplemental jurisdiction. But the Court nevertheless said no jurisdiction. Given the fundamental nature of the complete diversity requirement (no reason for a federal forum with less than complete diversity), § 1332 is not satisfied absent complete diversity. Since § 1332 is not satisfied, the court lacks "original jurisdiction" and thus lacks supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a). The court cannot "split" jurisdiction and exercise diversity between the diverse parties and supplemental between the non-diverse parties. And it was necessary to do this, lest an obvious drafting error blow up Strawbridge.

Several alert readers expressed confusion at this, pointing to a discrepancy between that and the final problem in the Glannon reading on supplemental jurisdiction. Glannon offers a version of this:

    A (NJ) ($ 1.5 m) + B (NJ) ($ 30k) v. X (DE).

This presents the same problem as the one we discussed in class--one of § 1322's "jurisdictional requirements" is missing in an action involving plaintiffs joined under Rule 20. The difference is that the missing requirement is not complete diversity but amount-in-controversy--one of the plaintiffs does not meet the jurisdictional minimum (recall that each plaintiff must seek > $ 75k from each defendant).

As Glannon explains, the Court in Exxon said there was supplemental jurisdiction over B's claim, since that combination is not listed in § 1367(b)'s exclusion.

So how do we square that with the problem from class? Exxon held that the complete diversity requirement is so fundamental that § 1332(a) is not satisfied without it (and because § 1332(a) is not satisfied, § 1367 does not grant supp jur). But the no-aggregation rule is less fundamental. The point of the AiC requirement is to ensure only "big cases" go to federal court. This case is "big" because A seeks millions of dollars, even if B seeks less than the jurisdictional minimum. So § 1332 is satisfied by complete diversity and the presence of A's large claim; the court therefore can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the one small claim because § 1367(b) does not address this line-up (joined plaintiffs).

Does that seem absurd? Absolutely. As Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent in Exxon, § 1332(a) by its terms does not create a hierarchy of elements. She argued that § 1332(a) is not satisfied (thus no supp jur is possible) unless all of § 1332(a) is satisfied.

Fortunately, this does not arise all that often for two reasons:

1) It is relatively rare that a plaintiff cannot meet the AiC requirement. Absent clear law or obviously minor injuries, it rarely "appears beyond doubt" plaintiff cannot recover more than $ 75k. Most defendants don't really contest it.

2) (More important): This problem only arises in a case of multiple plaintiffs against one defendant. Once we add defendants (joined pursuant to Rule 20), the case falls within the first category in § 1367(b): Claims by plaintiffs against persons made party under Rule 20, which is expressly excluded from supp jur.

Sometimes confusion is good. It means you are understanding things, so that stuff that does not fit causes confusion.

Moot Court 1L Interest Meeting

12:30 p.m., Friday, April 17.

I encourage everyone to attend and find out. The fall intramural competition is a a lot of fun and Moot Court is a great thing to show employers.

And remember: If you can handle this class, you can handle oral arguments.

For Thursday, April 2

Wednesday audio--Section B, Section A. Essay # 5 due in class tomorrow.

Correction to assignment for tomorrow, beyond what I said at the end of class:

    • Read this blog post and the linked pages.

    • Prep all of Shift to Minimum Contacts, including the Questions and Puzzles.

    •  Modern Analysis or The Shoe Algorithm; prep World Wide and Nicastro.

Into Friday, we will cover the rest of Modern Analysis, plus General Jurisdiction Revisited.

Personal Jurisdiction Preliminaries

On Thursday, we jump into into Personal Jurisdiction with International Shoe in 1945. But there is some background and about 70 years of stuff before Shoe. For purposes of time, this post provides basic background on civil litigation and personal jurisdiction prior to Shoe. Before reading the material assigned for Thursday, read this post in conjunction with Glannon pp. 69-71 and these pages from Glannon's prior edition (he removed this material from the current edition, but has given permission to share the old pages).

Tuesday, March 31, 2026

Change to Essay Schedule

I understand that your final LSV briefs are due on Saturday, April 11. I understand that but for this Sunday being Easter, they would have been due this Sunday, April 5. So this coming weekend is really the "final" weekend to work on the brief.

Because I try to avoid assigning essays during that final "real" LSV weekend, I am changing the schedule as follows:

Essay # 6: Will be posted on Wednesday, April 8; due on Wednesday, April 15.

Essay # 7: Will be posted on Thursday, April 9; due on Thursday, April 16. 

Friday, March 27, 2026

For Wednesday, April 1

Friday audio: Section B, Section A. Section A meets at 12:30 on Wednesday. Essay # 5 due in class Wednesday. Essay # 6 will post on Wednesday.

A clarification on our different versions of VOA.

    • If VOA and BSO are not diverse, there is almost certainly supplemental jurisdiction over VOA's actual state law claims--they are part of the controversy over BSO's use of the photos during the 2012 season.

    • If VOA and BSO are diverse, the fictional old contract claim can be brought--FRCP 18(a) does not require relatedness and there is an independent basis for jurisdiction (§ 1332).

    • If VOA and BSO are not diverse but the fictional old claim is for Trademark infringement, it can be brought--FRCP 18(a) does not require relatedness and there is an independent basis for jurisdiction (§ 1331 and § 1338).

    • The problem is if the fictional old claim is for breach of contract and they are not diverse--FRCP 18(a) is ok but there is no independent basis for jurisdiction and § 1367(a) requires relatedness.

Again, this is how § 1367 limits FRCP 18(a). And it is why it is better for the party to find jurisdiction under § 1331 or § 1332. 

Prep the rest of Supplemental Jurisdiction; try to make heads or tails of § 1367(b). We will begin with the connection between the joinder standard under the FRCP and the jurisdictional standard under § 1367--how do the standards relate and what does that mean in terms of the claims that can be brought and whether there is jurisdiction? Be ready to analyze Jones and the counterclaim in Kinsmann.

Then prep Removal, working the connection among the statutory provisions.

I hope to finish SMJ on Thursday and begin PJ that day and into Friday. 

 

Thursday, March 26, 2026

Complaint v. FIU (Updated and moved to top)

Filed on Monday evening. I present this without comment on the substantive merits of the claim or on the morality of the speech at issue.

Three things of note:

• The Complaint is surprisingly restrained, given the high-profile nature of the case and the perverse incentives for the plaintiff and the attorney in such a case. No over-the-top rhetoric, no performative outrage, no pleading-as-press-release. The statement is short-and-plain--six pages (plus eight pages of exhibits).

• The Complaint does not quote or describe the statements at issue. Paragraph 16 characterizes the statements ("racial slurs, gender-based slurs, antisemitic rhetoric, and anti-LGBTQ language"), then alleges that none falls within a category of unprotected speech.  Is that sufficient? Must the complaint plead the actual statements (or do more than characterize) in order for the court to evaluate whether they are protected? For present purposes, it is enough  to know that racist, sexist, antisemitic, anti-LGBTQ+ speech is not per se unprotected by the First Amendment; something more is required to make the speech punishable. The case will turn on whether that "something more" was present on that group chat. Given that legal framework, has plaintiff done enough to state a plausible claim that the "something more" is absent here and that his speech is the sort of offensive speech that nevertheless remains protected?

• We have not discussed some unique procedures that govern constitutional litigation, where plaintiffs seek an injunction to stop enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state law or policy. For the moment, the Complaint is less important than the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction that plaintiff likely will file in the next week or so. This will argue that the speech is protected and will ask the court to stop the investigation while the litigation is pending and until the case can reach a final judgment. The motion previews the merits, asking whether the plaintiff is "likely to succeed on the merits"--whether he is likely to show that his speech is constitutionally protected from government sanction. The grant or denial of that motion is immediately appealable (§ (a)), meaning the case would quickly go to the Eleventh Circuit.

Update: The question of whether the complaint is sufficient turns on whether a court can evaluate whether the speech is protected without seeing the actual statements in the group chat, which are not in the Complaint. Several people proposed a possible solution: The complaint refers to the group chat and attaches documents that refer to the group chat. So is that sufficient to incorporate the entire group chat as having been referenced and relied upon and thus made part of the complaint?

For Friday, March 26

Thursday audio--Section B, Section A. Essay # 5 posted. Essay # 6 will post next Wednesday.

We will finish Diversity Jurisdiction. Read through Zambelli (in Supp Materials--I forgot to put in on the Syllabus); it illustrates how the analysis of an LLC may dig several layers down until you find a non-derivative member/owner. It also shows how FRCP 19(b) fits into this.

Given what we now know about the differences between corporations and other entities, where is VOA a citizen? Can we tell from the Complaint? Where do we its citizenship is?

How does a court determine amount-in-controversy in an action for something other than money damages--for example, injunction, specific performance of a contract, reinstatement to a job 

Read the primer on § 1331 and federal question jurisdiction. That will give you the basics that you need for our purposes. We dig into this in greater detail in Federal Courts. Section 1331 is the main statute to keep in mind.

On Friday, we turn to Supplemental Jurisdiction. Prep § 1367(a) and (c), the assigned rules (plus FRCP 18), Glannon pp. 263-71, and questions 1-8.

 

Answers to Preliminary Exam

You can check your own work and figure out what you scored. You also can work the problems a la Gannon and figure out why the correct answer is correct and why your. answer might not have been. Happy to answer any questions.

1.         (C)

2.         (A)

3.         (B)

4.         (C)

5.         (B)

6.         (D)

7.         (A)

8.         (C)

9.         (D)

10.        (B)

Section B:

Mean: 47.38

Median: 50

High: 50

 

Section A

Mean: 45.44

Median: 45

High: 50

Federal Question Jurisdiction: A Primer

To save class time, a primer on Federal question juridiction; you can read and take notes here. Review this prior to class on Friday and next week, as it will be helpful in understanding  Supplemental Jurisdiction

Read this in conjunction with the assigned (and linked) statutes. You can supplement this with Glannon pp. 25-30 and Part I.A of Royal Canin v. Wullschleger; both offer a nice basic overview.

We cover Federal Question Jurisdiction in greater depth in Federal Courts, an upper-level class that I encourage you to take during the next two years.

Yes, you are responsible for knowing this and it is fair game for the exam.

Essay # 5 (Section B)

Download here. Due in class next Thursday, April 2.

Essay # 5 (Section A)

Download here. Due in class next Thursday, April 2.

Wednesday, March 25, 2026

For Thursday, March 26

Wednesday audio: Section B, Section A. Please note some schedule changes for the coming week. Answers to Prelim Exam will post tomorrow morning.  Essay # 5 will post at 12:30 tomorrow, due in class next Thursday.

Review and prep all of Diversity Jurisdiction, beginning with the puzzles. In analyzing these, be aware that the reason there is not complete diversity is different from the reason why there is minimal diversity; keep them separate. Think about why the statute requires complete diversity, especially how it relates to the purposes of diversity, and consider the arguments against that requirement.

Finally, to bring us back to early topics: The Justice Department sued Harvard for violating Title VI (which prohibits race discrimination by universities receiving federal funds), over its failure to stop campus antisemitism and its continued use of race in admissions. But, as the article describes, Harvard had previously sued DOJ and won on summary judgment (the case is on appeal), arguing that the federal government had improperly withheld federal funds from Harvard. So at least some of the issues that DOJ must prove to win its case were resolved on the SJ decision in Harvard's lawsuit. And that may trigger some issue preclusion arguments in the new action.

Note also that Harvard, as plaintiff, won on SJ. Another case in which the facts were undisputed (DOJ withheld the $ without following process) and the question is whether that violated Title VI and the First Amendment.

Schedule Changes for coming weeks

Section A:

Wednesday, April 1: Meet from 9-10:10 (necessary to accommodate the holy day beginning that evening).

Friday, April 10: Meet from 2-3:20 (necessary to accommodate Admitted Students Day)

Friday, April 17: Meet from 2-3:20 (necessary to accommodate an LSV program)

Section B:

• Wednesday, April 8: Meet from 9-10:10 (flip Crim and Civ Pro this day)

• Friday, April 10: Class will meet at our regular time in RDB 1000 (Large Courtroom). Students will be visiting for Admitted Students Day. Everyone should be especially prepared and at the top of their game.