Section A: Median: 23; Mean: 21.8
Section B: Median: 20; Mean: 20
Honorable Paula Patrick v. The Daily Beast Co. and Laura Bradley
The court should grant defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6) and dismiss plaintiff’s defamation claim with prejudice and without leave to amend.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal or factual sufficiency of a pleading stating a claim for relief. The court analyzes the four corners of the complaint, written instruments attached as exhibits and made part of the pleading for all purposes (FRCP 10(c)), and matters of which the court takes judicial notice. The court may consider a writing not attached to the pleading if the pleading refers to and relies on that writing. Twombly. If the court considers material outside the pleading, it must convert the motion to one for summary judgment. FRCP 12(d). The court therefore can consider the April 30 Philadelphia Inquirer article in resolving the 12(b)(6), without converting the motion. Although the complaint does not include the article as an exhibit, it quotes and refers to it, identifying it as one of the sources defendants relied on for their story. (¶¶ 26-27, 29). As with the magazine article in Twombly, the court can view the entire article because the pleading mentions and uses it.
A pleading asserting a defamation claim must comport with FRCP 8(a)(2), requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint provides the defendant with “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly; Conley. Under Twombly, as affirmed in Iqbal, a complaint must contain sufficient nonconclusory factual matter to raise a right to relief that is “plausible on its face.” It must plead sufficient non-conclusory facts, taken as true, to plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. The plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal. The allegations must be more than “neutral” or consistent with liability, such that they show a plausible entitlement to relief. Stated differently, the allegations must show that relief is more than possible (that the defendant could have engaged in wrongdoing) although it need not be probable (more likely than not the defendant engaged in wrongdoing). Labels, “bald” legal conclusions, and formulaic or threadbare recitations of the elements of a claim are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Iqbal. Non-conclusory allegations accepted as true must identify a real-world transaction or occurrence, describing specific action by specific individuals.
The court examines well-pleaded, non-conclusory facts, taken as true, and
whether they state a plausible claim for relief, given the elements of the
substantive law. Iqbal. This “context-specific task” requires the
“reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense” to decide
whether the plaintiff has plausibly alleged an entitlement to recovery. Iqbal;
Twombly. A plaintiff sufficiently pleads through direct factual
allegations and through factual allegations permitting reasonable inferences of
liability. Iqbal. The court draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of the pleading party.
Defendants’ motion focuses on the element of actual malice, that the defendant made the statements knowing they were false or with reckless disregard for their falsity. Graboff. Actual malice means the defendant did not care about the truth of the statements. McCafferty. Defendant must subjectively doubt the truth of the statements. Tucker.
The amended complaint fails to sufficiently allege actual malice.
The complaint includes numerous allegations that the defendants’ statements were knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly false (¶¶ 6, 8, 23, 27, 33, 35). But these are conclusory allegations not entitled to a presumption of truth—these are threadbare recitations of the “bald” legal conclusion sought, without describing specific real-world transactions involving specific people.
The nonconclusory facts allege three points: 1) Defendants published the story with the intent to harm plaintiff (¶¶ 6, 37); 2) Defendants did no independent investigation of the statements, relying on other sources, including the Inquirer article (¶¶ 29-31); and 3) Defendants ignored the plaintiff’s denials. (¶¶ 33, 38). The complaint contains no other nonconclusory allegations that defendants knew the report was false or doubted its truth.
These allegations do not plausibly show actual malice—they do not allow a reasonable judge to conclude defendants acted with actual malice—under substantive law. First, defendants’ intent or desire to injure plaintiff is irrelevant to actual malice; actual malice is about defendants’ understanding of the truth of their statements, not their ill will, malice, bad motive, or negative feelings towards the plaintiff. McCafferty. Second, failure to investigate some facts, without more, does not establish actual malice. Journalists may rely on prior news reports in publishing a story; actual malice attaches only with facts showing they subjectively doubted the truth of the prior reports on which they relied. Tucker. This complaint contains no such additional facts, so the allegations of failure to investigate do not plausible show actual malice. Finally, a reporter’s refusal to accept a person’s denials does not plausible show actual malice; denial alone does “not alert the conscientious reporter to the likelihood that his statements are false or in error.” Harte-Hankes.
The court should dismiss with prejudice and without giving plaintiff leave to replead.
Plaintiff’s claim is factually insufficient--it lacks enough non-conclusory facts necessary to show a plausible inference defendants acted with actual malice. A court ordinarily should dismiss a factually insufficient complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend; by adding more of the right kind of facts, a plaintiff might be able to correct the defects and plead a plausible claim. But plaintiff has filed three insufficient complaints. She filed and withdrew a complaint in state court. The court dismissed her original federal complaint. And the current amended complaint continues to fail to state a plausible claim for recovery. Plaintiff’s repeated failures show she does not have sufficient facts to plead a plausible claim; the court need not give her another attempt.
