Final Exam (Both Sections)

Exam Instructions. Sec. A Assignments. Sec. B Assignments.

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Good luck.

FInal Exam Assignments--Section A

After the Jump.

Final Exam Assignments--Section B

After the jump.

Final Exam Instructions

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Civil Procedure

Professor Howard Wasserman

FIU College of Law

Spring 2025

Final Examination

Format:

 

This is a take-home final examination. It consists of sixteen (16) questions. You will answer three (3).

   • One question requires a short answer (it should take you fewer than 45 words) and is worth twenty (20) points. Everyone will answer this question. It is clearly identified.

   • One question requires an essay of a maximum of 1000 words. It will involve forum selection. It is worth fifty (50) points. It will be randomly assigned,

   • On question requires an essay of a maximum of 1000 words (although you may need fewer words). It  will involve some other issue from the class material. It is worth fifty (50) points.

 

Assignments will be posted on the FIU Civ Pro Blog (www.fiucivpro.blogspot.com) at 9 p.m. Sunday, April 27, 2025.

 

The exam will be available for download from the FIU Civ Pro Blog (www.fiucivpro.blogspot.com) at 9 a.m. Monday, April 28, 2024; papers are due outside my office by 1 p.m. on Tuesday, April 29, 2024. You have 28 hours to work on this exam, which is more than you will need. You cannot work for 28 hours; don’t try.

Study Break

The original blog posts for the class included this video from two prior FIU students (this was their creative project) and this video from a former student at Indiana University. I said they would make no sense in January. But I promised that you would understand everything by the end of the class.

And so you do.

Final Creative Projects (Section B)

Links to the two projects we were unable to present today. My apologies for the tech glitches.

Sarah and Francis 

Zach and Garrett

Essays ## 9 and 10

Available outside my office after 10 a.m. Wednesday.

Sec. A:

Essay # 9: Mean: 17.93; Median: 17

Essay # 10: Mean: 19.64; Median: 19

Sec. B:

Essay # 9: Mean: 17.85; Median: 19

Essay # 10: Mean: 19.43; Median: 20 

Final Classes

Section B, Section A.

Sec. B Q&A begins at 10 a.m. Friday in RDB 2006. Sec. A Q&A begins at 1 p.m. Friday in RDB 2008. You may attend the session for both sections, although the first 30 minutes-or-so will be devoted to creative projects.

Send me recorded and other online projects. If you did something visual and non-interactive, please print it out to display in the room. Make sure the name of all participants is on it.

The exam will post here at 9 a.m. Monday. It is due outside my office by 1 p.m. Tuesday.

Claims and Defenses

Cunningham v. Cornell University (decided last week) offers a different angle on the differences between claim elements and affirmative defenses and the pleading consequences of each.

The case shows a piece we did not discuss in class--the role of statutory interpretation in figuring out which is which. Where § 1 of a statute prohibits some conduct and § 2 provides exemptions from § 1, the best reading is that § 1 lays out the elements the plaintiff must plead and § 2 is an affirmative defense.

The case also discusses the role of FRCP 7(a)(7) and replies to answers as a mechanism to control weak cases. A court can order a plaintiff to file a Reply to an Answer without a request, allowing a 12(c) motion to resolve the affirmative defense early in the case.

For Final Class on Monday

Part II of Section B audio glitched out; here is Part I. Section A--Part I, Part II. Both classes cover the same material, so everyone can use the Section A audio for both parts.

Essays ## 9 and 10 due at the start of the Monday make-up classes (11 a.m. Section B, 4 p.m. Section A). Essay # 8 outside my office.

Quick clarification on # 4: The prevailing view rests with the plaintiff--Rules 12 and 56 occupy the field and leave no room for the state law motion.

For preparation:

    • Return to Puzzle # 1. What is the argument that the state disclosure law should apply? Consider the (likely) purposes behind that law--what is the legislature trying to achieve by requiring disclosure of funders?

    • What is the argument for the invalidity of FRCP 15(c)(1)(B) and (C)?

Finally, here is the additional problem; this presents a question about the source of judicial analysis that matters to the § 1652 question.

Doe v. X (SD Fla).

    A sues X for sexual battery. A wishes to proceed pseudonymously as "Doe," rather than including her real name in the caption of the complaint. (Her identity would be disclosed to the court and the parties--it just would not appear in the complaint). State law provides that victims of sexual torts can sue under a pseudonym; federal courts apply a multi-factor balancing test, balancing the plaintiff's reasonable fear of harm from litigating under her own name against the presumptively open nature of judicial proceedings.

    What are the arguments and analysis in both directions--in favor of state law applying and against state law applying? Again, consider why the rules exist and what they seek to achieve.

For Friday (Double Session)

Thursday audio--Section A, Section B.

With the analytical framework presented in class Thursday (derived from §§ 1652 and 2072, Erie, and Hanna and as elaborated upon in the Glannon reading), work through these cases. You can also work through the problems in Glannon to help, as they show much of the same analysis.

Each case involves a state law claim in federal court on diversity jurisdiction (the necessary predicate to ever having to do an RDA/REA/Erie/Hanna analysis). Each case introduces a state-law provision; the question is whether the federal court must apply that provision.

In prepping, consider how each issue arises procedurally--what parties do to trigger consideration of choice of law and what law will apply. Unless indicated otherwise, it is on you to figure out what federal laws or FRCP provisions are in play based on your knowledge of the rules (hint: Some discuss rules we have learned, others require you to identify and interpret new rules in the FRCP--you are familiar enough with the rules as a whole). You must consider (even if speculating) the underlying purpose of both the federal law (whether FRCP, statute, or judge-made rule) and the underlying purpose of the competing state law--what are the various rules designed to achieve. To the extent you see two possible answers to a problem (including competing paths through the analysis or competing conclusions), be ready to argue both.

Be ready to walk through the analysis beyond the broad outline from the board--use the precise language from the rules, statutes, and cases.

For Thursday

Wednesday audio--Section A, Section B. Essay ## 9 and 10 due in class on Monday, April 21.

Couple points of clarification on Venue:

    1) § 1391(b)(3) says "if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action." That does not mean you apply (b)(3) if (b)(1) and (b)(2) are not satisfied as to the current district. You turn to (b)(3) in the chosen district only if no other federal district satisfies (b)(1) or (b)(2). If another district satisfies either--even if it is not the district in which the plaintiff seeks to bring the action--then the first part of (b)(3) is not satisfied and cannot be used to establish venue in the current district.

    2) Here is Fla. Code § 1.061, which codifies Forum Non Conveniens in Florida.

    3) Here is § 1.060, which covers transfer between trial courts of Florida. Because it is within the same sovereign, it is transfer rather than FNC dismissal.

    4) Review FN 6 from Atlantic Marine here. Your "rule" for transfer and FNC is both this and the language from Glannon (citing Gilbert).

We move to Erie, which I confess is my favorite part of the class. It also provides a nice way to review everything that we have covered this semester.

For tomorrow, prep Introduction and History, which will cover Erie itself, then Modern Approach, which will be all about Hanna and the analytical framework that comes from that case. The Glannon reading and problems (pp. 193-211 and 213-32) will be really helpful in preparing and understanding this. Read § 1652 and §§ 2072 and 2074 very carefully and understand what they are about, as well as the assigned constitutional provisions. Consider:

    • What does the Rules of Decision Act say and mean?

    • What was the issue in Erie and what were the different answers in federal court and state court under Swift? Who wins in Erie, given resolution of the choice-of-law issue?

    • Erie overrules Swift in four steps--what are they? What is forum shopping and why is it problematic? What is the difference between "horizontal" forum shopping and "vertical" forum shopping? 

    • If a federal court must predict how the state supreme court would resolve an issue, what can it look to in deciding that?

    • Under Hanna, what is the connection between the RDA and the Rules Enabling Act? 

    • What are the "twin aims of Erie?"

    • What is procedure? What is substance? What are the 3 types of rules we might have under Hanna?

I hope to go through the two cases and the framework in tomorrow's extended class. Then we will spend Friday's double session and Monday's class working through a series of puzzles that show how this all works.

Essays ## 9 & 10 (Sec. B)

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Essays ## 9 & 10 (Sec. A) (Updated)

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A technical glitch caused Section B's essay to post twice. This is the proper essay for Section A. Given the time gap, you have until 4 p.m. next Monday, April 21 (the start of our make-up class) to turn this in.

Final points on personal jurisdiction

Now that we have completed PJ, I want to flag some things beyond our in-class conversation but that might be helpful.

• See Glannon pp. 149-51 for an example of a permissible Quasi-in-Rem II action after Shaffer (where the property must relate to the claim).

• Here is FN 19 in Daimler:

We do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case, see, e.g., Perkins, described supra, at 10–12, and n. 8, a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State. But this case presents no occasion to explore that question, because Daimler’s activities in California plainly do not approach that level. It is one thing to hold a corporation answerable for operations in the forum State, see infra, at 23, quite another to expose it to suit on claims having no connection whatever to the forum State. 

This leaves open the possibility that a court might exercise general jurisdiction outside where a defendant is "essentially at home." But it would have to be a case analogous to Perkins--a company that relocates its office when its home country is invaded during a World Are; that seems unlikely. No court since Daimler has found an exceptional case. Courts generally do not even consider the prospect in the analysis.

• Here is FN 20 in Daimler:

To clarify in light of Justice Sotomayor’s opinion concurring in the judgment, the general jurisdiction inquiry does not “focu[s] solely on the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.” Post, at 8. General jurisdiction instead calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them. Otherwise, “at home” would be synonymous with “doing business” tests framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in the United States. See von Mehren & Trautman 1142–1144. Nothing in International Shoe and its progeny suggests that “a particular quantum of local activity” should give a State authority over a “far larger quantum of . . . activity” having no connection to any in-state activity. Feder, supra, at 694.Justice Sotomayor would reach the same result, but for a different reason. Rather than concluding that Daimler is not at home in Cali- fornia, Justice Sotomayor would hold that the exercise of general jurisdiction over Daimler would be unreasonable “in the unique circumstances of this case.” Post, at 1. In other words, she favors a resolution fit for this day and case only. True, a multipronged reasonableness check was articulated in Asahi, 480 U. S., at 113–114, but not as a free-floating test. Instead, the check was to be essayed when specific jurisdiction is at issue. See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 476–478 (1985). First, a court is to determine whether the connection between the forum and the episode-in-suit could justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction. Then, in a second step, the court is to consider several additional factors to assess the reasonableness of entertaining the case. When a corporation is genuinely at home in the forum State, however, any second-step inquiry would be superfluous.Justice Sotomayor fears that our holding will “lead to greater unpredictability by radically expanding the scope of jurisdictional dis- covery.” Post, at 14. But it is hard to see why much in the way of discovery would be needed to determine where a corporation is at home. Justice Sotomayor’s proposal to import Asahi’s “reasonableness” check into the general jurisdiction determination, on the other hand, would indeed compound the jurisdictional inquiry. The reasonableness factors identified in Asahi include “the burden on the defendant,” “the interests of the forum State,” “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief,” “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,” “the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies,” and, in the international context, “the procedural and substantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction.” 480 U. S., at 113–115 (some internal quotation marks omitted). Imposing such a checklist in cases of general jurisdiction would hardly promote the efficient disposition of an issue that should be resolved expeditiously at the outset of litigation. 

So two things to take away from this: 1) The FN accepts the two-step Shoe analysis--minimum contacts followed by a reasonableness analysis (it skips the give rise prong, but it's implicitly there). In other words, the "squishy balancing" is part of the analysis, contra the hesitancy in McIntrye and Ford. 2) There is an open question whether a court must do the traditional notions balancing even when defendant is at home; Ginsburg's answer is that this would be superfluous--if the defendant is at home, of course it is not unreasonable because there can be no burden.

• Finally: This is a bit dated (from 2006) given the run of recent cases, but it is amazing:

For Wednesday

Friday audio: Section B I; Section B II; Section A. Essay # 8 due Wednesday. Essays # 9 and 10 will post on Monday; due on Monday, April 21. (Please make sure you do the correct essay for your section). 

Thank you for your patience and effort the past two days. It was a lot to get through and I am glad we got through it.

Prep all of Venue, Change of Venue, Forum Non Conveniens--note the several statutory provisions to really parse and arrange to see how they fit together; work through the venue analysis for yourself. Here is FN 6 in Atlantic Marine (the note is attached to the end of the first sentence of Part III.A); compare this with Glannon pp. 182-85:

Factors relating to the parties’ private interests include “relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, (internal quotation marks omitted). Public-interest factors may include “the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home; [and] the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court must also give some weight to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum. See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick.

    • What is the difference between improper venue and change of venue--in terms of how they are raised, what they argue, and the appropriate remedy?

    • How do venue rules relate to removal of an action from state court? 

    • What is the difference between § 1404 and forum non conveniens? How are they the same? What are the three steps in the analysis?

    • Look at VOA: Is venue proper in ND Cal and why?

  • Burger King is sued in the Southern District of Florida and the Middle District of Florida. How would the venue and PJ analyses differ in those two cases? 

For Friday

Thursday audio: Section B; Section A I; Section A II. 

Here is the Notice of Removal in Worldwide. Again, because of § 1446(c)(1) (enacted post-1980), this could not happen today.

Finish Modern Approach--Nicastro, Burger King and Walden. Then prep the remaining sections of Personal Jurisdiction.

    • Did Nicastro resolve which is required (hint: count the votes). Where can Nicastro sue, if not New Jersey? Does FRCP 4(k)(2) have anything to say on this?

    • How does a contract create minimum contacts? What is the test and what are the jurisdictional facts in BK?

    • What is the "effects test" for PJ? How does Walden distinguish Calder?

    • Why would there by jurisdiction over Roper (the Walmart driver) in Morgan?

    • What is the difference between general and specific jurisdiction? When is a defendant subject to general jurisdiction according to Daimler? How does the question of specific or general jurisdiction fit into the Shoe framework? What happens if there is no specific jurisdiction?

    • How do property-based actions (in rem and quasi in rem) fit in the Shoe framework? (Review the old Glannon pages on property-based jurisdiction, as well as the Preliminaries of Personal Jurisdiction). Is there jurisdiction over the following:

    • How is personal jurisdiction analyzed for a non-US citizen? What about for a US citizen sued in another country?

    • State law requires entities to register to do business in the state and provides that registration constitutes submission to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state for all purposes. Valid?

Analyze jurisdiction in the following case, walking through the full analysis we have on the board: Clemens v. McNamee:

Clemens (TX), a former MLB pitcher, sues McNamee (NY), his former personal trainer for defamation in Texas state court. McNamee removes and moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

McNamee made a series of statements about administering performance-enhancing drugs to Clemens. He made the statements to MLB investigators in New York and to a reporter from Sports Illustrated during an interview in New York. The statements described administering the drugs to Clemens in New York and Toronto while playing for teams in those cities.

McNamee and Clemens had a long-standing relationship. Over the years McNamee traveled to Texas more than 35 times to work with and train Clemens.

Texas has the same catch-all long-arm statute as California.

Essay # 8 (Both Sections)

Download Regular Type; Download Large Type; Read after the jump. Due in class on Wednesday, April 16.

For Wednesday

Friday audio--Section A, Section B.  Essay # 7 due on Wednesday. Essay # 8 will post on Wednesday, due on Wednesday, April 16.

Two quick words on removal with multiple defendants in § 1446(b)(2).

    • Section (b)(2)(A) imposes unanimity--all defendants must agree to remove. But note that this is limited to defendants who have been joined. If ∆1 is served on June 1, it can remove without ∆2's consent if ∆2 has not been served.

    • Section (b)(2)(B) gives each defendant 30 days from service to remove (to file or join a Notice of Removal). But what happens if the defendants are not served at the same time, often months apart--what if ∆1 is served on June 1 and ∆2 is served on August 15 (past the time that ∆1 could remove)? Congress enacted (b)(2)(C) in 2011 and adopted the "Last-Served Defendant" Rule: The last-served defendant has 30 days to remove; any earlier-served ∆ can consent to that removal, even if his own 30 days to remove have lapsed. So in the example above--∆2 has 30 days from August 15 to remove; ∆2 can consent to that removal, although it no longer can join.

Move to Personal Jurisdiction. Before doing anything, read Preliminaries of Personal Jurisdiction blog post for background. Then prep all of Shift to Minimum Contacts, including Glannon pp. 93-100Read and prep all of World Wide Volkswagen. Review FRCP 12(h)(1).

    • How can each party consent or submit to a court's jurisdiction? 

    • How does Shoe change the standard for personal jurisdiction? When can a court exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant?

    • What is general personal jurisdiction, what is specific personal jurisdiction, and how do they differ? Look at Shoe and Daimler on this.

    • What is a "Long Arm Statute?" Why call it that?

    • How does the PJ analysis in federal court compare with the PJ analysis in state court? See FRCP 4(k).

    • Consider two cases. For both, review the removal statutes and piece together the removal process to understand how it will work in the case:

        1) A (TX) sues X (NY) for defamation Texas state court; the amount in controversy exceeds $ 75,000. You are X's attorney. You do not believe X is subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas. Your forum preferences, in order, are: 1) anywhere other than Texas; 2) federal court in Texas (if stuck in Texas); 3) state court in Texas (where he now is). As X's lawyer, what is your procedural strategy to obtain the most preferable forum?

        2) World Wide:

            Robinson (NY) sued Audi (a German company), Volkswagen of America (the US subsidiary, a NJ corporation with PPB in NJ), World-Wide Volkswagen (the regional distributor, a NY corporation), and Seaway (local dealer, a NY corporation). Robinson sued in Oklahoma state court. Audi and VWA are subject to PJ in Oklahoma, but prefer federal court. How can they make that happen?

            Also, Robinson and his family were driving through Oklahoma as part of a permanent move from NY to Arizona; Robinson had a new job and the family planned to stay in Arizona permanently. Why is Robinson a NY citizen?

    • How does World Wide adjust the two pieces of the Shoe standard and how do the two connect? How does a defendant establish "certain minimum contacts?" How can a defendant "purposefully avail?" In what way(s) did WW and Seaway, perhaps, purposefully avail?

Personal Jurisdiction Preliminaries

On Wednesday, we jump into into Personal Jurisdiction with International Shoe in 1945. But there is some background and about 70 years of stuff before Shoe. For purposes of time, this post provides basic background on civil litigation and personal jurisdiction prior to Shoe. Before reading the material assigned for Wednesday, read this post in conjunction with Glannon pp. 69-71 and these pages from Glannon's prior edition (he removed this material from the current edition, but has given permission to share the old pages).

For Thursday

Wednesday audio--Section A, Section B. Essay # 7 has posted. Essay # 8 will post on Thursday.

Review Supplemental Jurisdiction.

    • If VOA is also from Massachusetts, there is no supplemental jurisdiction over the hypothetical old contract claim. But what about the actual state claims over the 2012 BSO season?

    • Ford (p.457) says § 1367(a) reaches the limits of Article III. What does that mean?

     • What is the connection between § 1367(a)'s standard and the standard for joinder in FRCP 13(a), (b), and (g); 14(a), and 20? There are 3 logical possibilities--what are they and which does Jones adopt? What does that mean for the counterclaim in Jones? What about the counterclaim in Kinsmann ((review our discussion of that from Responsive Pleadings).

    • Does § 1367(b) apply in Godin? What are the "jurisdictional requirements" of § 1332?

    • § 1367(b) identifies 3 categories of cases in which there is no supplemental jurisdiction. What do they have in common? Does § 1367(b) limit supplemental jurisdictional in the following (assume joinder is proper in all):

        • Metta wants to file a crossclaim against Nicely.

        • A (IA) v. X (NE). X (NE) impleads M (IA). A wants to file a claim against M.

        • A (FL) v. X (NY) and Y (FL) 

        • A (NJ) & B (DE) v. Walmart (DE/AR).

                (See also the discussion in Glannon (p.270) on this problem, especially as to the amount in controversy)

Then move to Removal. Read the assigned statutes (§§ 1441, 1446, and 1447) and map out the process for removal--when and how it functions and what the parties must do. What is the effect of filing a notice of removal? What is not required for a defendant to remove? What happens then? What is the timing for removal?

    • What is the logic of the "Forum Defendant Rule" of § 1441(b)(2)? 

    • A, Inc. (IL/IL) sues X, Inc. (PA/PA) in state court in Pennsylvania. The day after filing, X removes to federal court. Under § 1441(b)(2), is removal proper?

Essay # 7 (Sec. A)

Download Regular Type; Download Large Type; and after the jump. Due next Wednesday, April 9.

Two things in handling this case:

1) Math is required, as you must calculate time periods and number of dayss. You may use this site, which allows you to calculate the number of days between two dates.

2) You have pieces of deposition testimony and pieces of Affidavits. The Affidavit paragraphs are numbered. Each question and corresponding answer in the Dep is number (Q1 + A1; Q2 + A2; etc.). Be specific in what you cite to.

Pay attention to the role you are told to play.

Essay # 7 (Sec. B)

Download Regular Type; Download Large Type; Read after the jump. Due in class next Wednesday, April 9.

You have excerpts of an Affiadvit; the paragraphs are numbered. You have excerpts of a Deposition; the questions and corresponding answers are numbered (Q1 + A1; Q2 + A2; etc.). Please cite to evidence and be specific.

Pay attention to the role you are told to play.

 

 

For Wednesday

Friday audio--Section A, Section B. Essay # 7 will post on Wednesday, April 2, due Wednesday April 9.

Review the primer on federal question jurisdiction, along with § 1331 and Glannon pp. 25-30. You will need to have a basic grasp of "arising under" jurisdiction to understand supplemental jurisdiction. What federal claims do we see in VOA and in Godin?

We move to Supplemental Jurisdiction, which involves § 1367, an unfortunately confusing statute. Prep everything to cover Wednesday and Thursday. Review your notes from earlier in the semester on the definition of a claim, FRCP 8(a)(1), and joinder under FRCP 13, 14, 18, and 20.

    • Is there supplemental jurisdiction in VOA and in Godin and why?

    • Is there supplemental jurisdiction over Winston's counterclaims and why? Does it matter to whether the court can hear this counterclaim?

    • What might cause the court to decline jurisdiction under § 1367(c) and what facts might the court consider?

    • When should the parties and court rely on § 1367(a) and how does that reveal problems with how VOA pleaded its citizenship?

    • Why is it preferable to establish diversity jurisdiction rather than rely on § 1367?

    • Ford says § 1367(a) reaches the limits of Article III. What does that mean?

     • What is the connection between § 1367(a)'s standard and the standard for joinder in FRCP 13(a), (b), and (g); 14(a), and 20? There are 3 logical possibilities--what are they and which does Jones adopt? What does that mean for the counterclaim in Jones? What about the counterclaim in Kinsmann?

    • Recall the (fictional) prior-contract claim between VOA and BSO. Can it be joined under the rules? Is there jurisdiction? How does the answer change if Sohm is a California citizen and the only member of VOA or if VOA has another member who is a Massachusetts citizen.

    • Does § 1367(b) apply in Godin? What are the "jurisdictional requirements" of § 1332?

    • § 1367(b) identifies 3 categories of cases in which there is no supplemental jurisdiction. What do they have in common? Does § 1367(b) limit supplemental jurisdictional in the following (assume joinder is proper in all):

        • A (FL) sues X (CA) and Y (CA). X files a cross claim against Y. Y impleads its insurer, M (CA).

        • A (IA) v. X (NE). X (NE) impleads M (IA). A wants to file a claim against M.

        • A (NJ) & B (DE) v. Walmart (DE/AR).

                (See also the discussion in Glannon on this problem, especially as to the amount in controversy)

Federal Question Jurisdiction: A Primer

To save class time, a primer on Federal question juridiction; you can read and take notes here. Review this prior to class on Friday and next week, as it will be helpful in understanding  Supplemental Jurisdiction. , as well as looking at the assigned (and linked) statutes.

Read this in conjunction with the assigned (and linked) statutes; you can supplement this with Glannon pp. 25-30, which gives a nice basic overview.

We cover Federal Question Jurisdiction in greater depth in Federal Courts, an upper-level class that I encourage you to take during the next two years.

Yes, you are responsible for knowing this and it is fair game for the exam.

For Friday (Double Session)

Thursday audio--Section A, Section B. Essay # 6 due in class tomorrow.

We will finish Diversity Jurisdiction, so read and/or review all pieces of that. What are Mrs. Mas' possible domiciles and where did the court land as to her citizenship and why?

  • Consider the bases for jurisdiction (or lack of jurisdiction) of the following:

        • A (PR) v. X (DC) 

        • A (Cuba) v. X (FL)

        • A (Cuba) v. X (Venezuela)

        • A (TX) & B (China) v. X (Taiwan)

        • A (TX) & B (FL) v. X (Taiwan) & Y (FL)

        • A (Cuba/Lawful permanent resident domiciled in FL) v. X (FL)

        • A (NY) v. X (US Citizen domiciled in France) 

    • How do you determine domicile for corporations? What about for non-corporate business entities? What is the significance of entities having (potentially) multiple domiciles? Is there diversity jurisdiction in Morgan? What about in VOA?

    • What happens if adverse parties are entities (incorporated or unincorporated) with multiple citizenships? Consider whether there is jurisdiction (and on what bases) in the following cases:

        • A, Inc (DE/DE) v. X, Ltd. (NJ/Canada)

        • A LLC (NY/Mexico) v. X, Ltd. (NJ/Canada)

    • What is the purpose of the amount-in-controversy requirement? How do you determine if it is satisfied? What if the case seeks equitable relief (such as specific performance or an injunction)?

    • Plaintiff files in state court and wants to make clear the case cannot be filed in federal court because of the amount-in-controversy, by dramatically being .01 below the threshold. The complaint states "The amount in controversy is $ 74,999.99 and not one cent more." What did the lawyer do wrong, if the goal was to be .01 below?

    • What happens if the court finds non-diverse adverse parties and thus no jurisdiction?

We hopefully will begin Supplemental Jurisdiction, which involves § 1367, an unfortunately confusing statute. For tomorrow, prep § 1367(a), FRCP 18, and FRCP 82. Review your notes on the definition of a "claim" and consider the number, type, and jurisdictional bases for the claims in VOA and Godin.

For Thursday

Wednesday audio--Section A, Section B.  Essay # 6 due Friday--Please note that Plaintiff objected to those discovery requests from Defendant. Essay # 7 will post next Wednesday, April 2, due on Wednesday, April 9.

We continue with Diversity Jurisdiction; prep the entire section, which will take us through Friday. Review your notes (from the second day of the semester) on the basic structure of the federal judiciary and the difference between exclusive jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction.

    • What are the policies behind diversity jurisdiction? How does placing cases in federal court serve those policies?

    • A(FL) sues X (NY) in federal court in Louisiana; is there subject matter jurisdiction?

    • What is complete diversity and minimal diversity? What is required, by what source of law, and why? How does that requirement relate to the purposes of diversity jurisdiction? What is the argument in favor of minimal diversity and what are the problems with that argument, given the purposes of diversity jurisdiction?

    • What is the statutory basis for jurisdiction in Mas and why? Why is it necessary to consider the citizenship of Mrs. Mas in addition to Mr. Mas?

    • Consider whether there is complete, minimal, or no diversity in the following:

        • A (FL) v X (FL)

        • A (FL) v. X (NY)

        • A (FL) v. X (NY) & Y (FL)

        • A (CA) v. X (NY) & Y (MN)

        • A (NY) & B (FL) v. X (NJ) & Y (FL)

        • A (NY) & B (FL) v. X (NJ) & Y (IL)

        • A (NY) & B (NY) v. X (CA) & Y (CA)

        • A (NY) v. Audi (Ger) & VWA (NJ) & WorldWide (NY) & Seaway (NY)

    • What is domicile? What is change of domicile? What facts and evidence can parties use to prove domicile?  Where is Mrs. Mas a citizen?

    • Consider the bases for jurisdiction of the following:

        • A (PR) v. X (DC) 

        • A (Cuba) v. X (FL)

        • A (Cuba) v. X (Venezuela)

        • A (TX) & B (China) v. X (Taiwan)

        • A (TX) & B (FL) v. X (Taiwan) & Y (FL)

        • A (Cuba/Lawful permanent resident domiciled in FL) v. X (FL)

        • A (NY) v. X (US Citizen domiciled in France)

For Wednesday

Friday audio--Section A, Section B. Essay # 6 posted; Essay # 7 will post next Friday.

We will finish Summary Judgment on Wednesday; review the remaining provisions of FRCP 56, along with the 7th Amendment. Look at the problems on pp. 408, 409, and 417 in Glannon. 

    • When can a party that will have the burden of persuasion/initial burden of production at trial (e.g., plaintiff on her claim) get summary judgment and what must that plaintiff do in support of the motion for summary judgment?

    • Consider the Black Non-Attorney who was denied a job as a lawyer because he is Black and because he is not an attorney. Under the substantive law of "mixed-motive cases," the plaintiff must show that race played a role in the decision, then the burden of production shifts to the defendant to show it would have made the same decision regardless of race. The plaintiff has the burden of persuasion.

        • How could each party move for summary judgment in this case? What are the two material facts the parties will fight over? What would each party need to do to support its motion on each issue?

    • What happens if both parties believe they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law?

    • What happens if a plaintiff gets partial summary judgment? What happens if a defendant gets partial summary judgment?

We then move to Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Prep Overview, in addition to FRCP 8(a)(1), 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3), and § 1332(a).

    • When does each party consider whether the case is in the correct forum?

    • How does each party (the plaintiff filing in federal court and the defendant sued in federal court) present issues about subject matter jurisdiction to the Court?

    • What is the constitutional structure of the federal judiciary? What does Article III tell us about the jurisdiction of the federal courts? What doesn't it tell us about the jurisdiction of the federal courts? What is the connection between Article III and the various statutes, such as § 1331 and § 1332? (Note: We discussed Art. III § 1 and the basic court structure at the beginning of the semester--review those notes).

Essay # 6

Download Regular Type; Download Large Type; and after the jump. Due in class Friday, March 28.

Answer Key for Prelim

Section A: Mean: 9.106/10; Median: 10/10

Section B: Mean: 9.24/10; Median: 10/10

There is no need for me to hand papers back. You can compare your saved paper with this and calculate your points. If you have questions, come see me.

1) B.

    Need same transaction-or-occurrence and common question of law; C covers only the latter.

2) A.

    Certificate of Merit is a legal requirement, so it would go to legal sufficiency or insufficiency. Plaintiff still must plead sufficient facts to establish factual sufficiency.

3) C

    15(a)(1)(B) controls because it is a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required. SXSW has 21 days from when Federal moved. (B) is incorrect because a motion triggers the 21-day clock.

4) C

    Count I seeks contingent liability for current claims against SXSW, so 14(a)(1) allows it. Count II seeks liability for claims unrelated to the current action. But Count I makes SXSW and Federal opposing parties so 18(a) kicks in for Count II.

5) C

   This is futility--the amended pleading will not survive a Rule 12 motion (here a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).

6) D

    It is not futile if it properly pleads jurisdiction. Whether SMJ is waivable is irrelevant to the issue.

7) B 

     7(a)(5) provides the designation and this is the second time SXSW tried to amend it.

8) C

    Because the entire contract was attached to the pleading, the entire contract is part of the pleading, regardless of which parts the pleading expressly discussed. The 12(b)(6) can address anything in the attached written instrument.

9) A

    Application of the facts pleaded to the law of insurance exclusions. None of the others have any legal meaning.

10) D

    This is legal insufficiency and thus dismissal with prejudice. SXSW has no existing claim against Federal because the insurance exclusion applies. It does not matter what additional facts SXSW could plead--plaintiffs seek a refund, SXSW wants Federal to indemnify it for that refund, and the insurance exclusion precludes that claim.

For Friday

Thursday audio--Section A, Section B. Essay # 6 will post at 12:30 Friday.

Be ready to discuss the problems from Glannon p. 408, 409, and 417.

    • How much of a dispute is "genuine?" What is the slightest doubt test? What did Scott replace it with?

    • Can the Non-Movant oppose summary judgment based on the possibility of disbelief of the Movant's evidence? In Adickes, had the officer denied presence, could Adickes oppose summary judgment by arguing the jury might disbelieve the officer?

    • What is required for a valid affidavit? Does it matter that the affidavit is self-serving? What should the court do if one person's affidavit and deposition diverge. Imagine:

            Adickes Deposition: The student told me the officer was in the store. I didn't see anyone.

            Adickes Affidavit (submitted in opposition to SJ motion): I saw the officer in the store.

    • How does substantive law affect the summary judgment analysis? What if substantive law requires clear-and-convincing evidence? What if, in Adickes, the plaintiff produces evidence of presence but not of communication or agreement--make the argument for defendant on summary judgment.

    • Imagine the Court in Scott adopted a per se Fourth Amendment rule: A person fleeing police at high speeds is per se an imminent threat. How does that affect summary judgment in that case? How does it affect the argument that the video is not one-sided?

 Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston:

    Salazar-Limon sues the City of Houston on a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim arising from an officer shooting him during a traffic stop. Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer's use of force is justified if he reasonably feared an imminent threat to his life or safety. Courts have held that an officer can infer an imminent threat if a suspect reaches for his waistband.

    Defendant moves for summary judgment. Argue both sides.

    The record shows the following:

        Undisputed Facts:

                • Plaintiff was shot in the back

                • Plaintiff did not have a gun.

        Plaintiff Deposition:

            I was walking away from the officer. He shot me immediately after or within seconds of commanding me to stop. I did not turn or have a chance to turn before I was shot; the shot came right after the command. I did not have anything in my waistband.

        Officer Deposition:

            The suspect raised his hands as if he were reaching for his waistband. I shot after he made the motion with his hands towards his waistband.

For Friday

Wednesday audio--Section A, Section B. Prelim due at beginning of class tomorrow. Essay # 6 will post at 12:30 Friday.

We continue Summary Judgment; Make sure to read pp. 57-59 in Nunes v. Lizza; it offers nice synthesis of the summary judgment standard, incorporating the pieces we have discussed and will discuss tomorrow. 

    • If you have not done so, watch the Scott v. Harris video. Was the majority correct that the video is capable of one reasonable understanding? And how does that affect summary judgment? Why did Justice Stevens believe summary judgment was improper?

    • When the burden of production shifts to Party II, what can Party II with that shifted burden?

    • What are the procedures under the FRCP through which parties analyze burden of production, at trial and prior to trial? What is the connection between those procedures and their standards?

    • What did the court require of the movant in Adickes? What about in Celotex? Can you reconcile those approaches? How does current 56(c)(1) reconcile them? What was the problem with the affidavits in Adickes? 

    • What would have happened had Adickes gone to trial? How should that affect summary judgment?

    • How might Adickes have proceeded if the defendants followed the approach in Celotex?

    • How much evidence must the party offer to create a genuine dispute? How much uncertainty about the fact must there be?

    • What form will the evidence take when presented to support and oppose a motion? What evidence did Mrs. Catrett offer and what were the problems with it?

  

Some points on sanctions (Updated)

This came up during the Coca Cola exercise yesterday and is worth clarifying:

1) Some argued for Coca that the court should not default it because then Coca would be unable to comply--the case will be over. You need to think a bit more sharply about the purpose of sanctions. Yes, the court wants compliance. But it does not want compliance for the sake of compliance. It wants compliance so the litigation can proceed appropriately, with the Bottler receiving the information to which it is entitled in the litigation. The court imposes the sanction to ensure compliance; but if compliance will not happen, the sanction protects the litigation process and stops the disobedient party from interfering with that process. So the court will be perfectly happy if Coca defaults rather than complies because it gives the court what it wants--the litigation proceeds.

Put differently, the disobedient party cannot weaponize the desire to ensure compliance to mess up the litigation by not complying.

2) Same with the point someone made after class that a default means the case won't be resolved on the merits. Yes, the goal is resolution on the merits, where litigation functions as it should. But a party cannot interfere with the litigation, then complain about non-merits resolution. Compare a court issuing a default judgment under FRCP 55 if the defendant fails to answer--the defendant cannot avoid the default ("but then we will not resolve on the merits") by refusing to litigate.

2.5) For a real-world example of these points: See the reporting and commentary around the lawsuits by parents of the Sandy Hook shooting victims against Alex Jones. Jones refused to cooperate in discovery, the judge defaulted him on liability, then held trial on damages, awarding multi-millions in damages. Many argued that the court had violated the First Amendment by denying Jones the opportunity to raise (potentially valid) First Amendment defenses. But valid substantive defenses or rights do not allow you to ignore the rules of litigation. At some point (and the court was very patient), misbehavior within litigation leads to the loss of rights.

3) (b)(2)(A)(v) and (vi) are opposite sides of the coin--the disobedient party loses if it will not comply. (v) (dismissal) applies where the disobedient party brought the claim; (vi) (default) applies, as in our case, where the disobedient party is defending the claim.

4) See FRCP 37(a)(2)(C), which gives the court the option of imposing costs of the motion, including attorney's fees, in lieu of the listed (a)(2)(A) sanctions. So on the first go-round, a court could decide to impose costs, give the party additional time to comply, and see what happens. If it still does not comply, then an (a)(2)(A) sanction becomes appropriate. Again, it depends on the nature and blatantness of the disobedience.

For Wednesday

Friday audio--Section A, Section B. Prelim Exam due at the beginning of class next Thursday. Essay # 6 will post at 12:30 p.m. on Thursday.

We continue with Summary Judgment: Standards and Procedures. Be sure to review FRCP 50.

   • What is the connection between discovery and summary judgment?

    • How does summary judgment differ from 12(b)(6) and 12(c)? What will the court consider on a motion for summary judgment? What is a stipulation?

    • What is an affidavit or declaration (and how do they differ)? How else can a party preview a witness' testimony besides an affidavit or declaration? What is the difference and when will the party choose one or the other?

    • Break down the elements of FRCP 26(a) and the meaning of each key term. Think of how these terms apply in Scott, Adickes, and Celotex. What are the key facts in each case? How does the court decide each of these terms without acting as factfinder?

    • What is the burden of production and the burden of persuasion?

    • How do FRCP 50 and 56 relate to one another, according to Celotex?

    • What was wrong with the affidavits in Adickes? How could they have been corrected?

    • Can you reconcile Adickes and Celotex in terms of what the movant must do to support a summary judgment motion? What would have happened, on the evidence the plaintiff had, if Adickes had gone to trial? What does Justice White's concurrence in Celotex add to this question?

    • Imagine the plaintiff in Adickes opposing summary judgment via the Celotex method. What could the defendant ask for in discovery, how could plaintiff respond, and how could summary judgment proceed?

    • What makes a dispute genuine? How genuine must it be? How much uncertainty can there be about a fact to be in dispute?

    • What form must the evidence be on summary judgment? What evidence did Mrs. Catrett have in Celotex? 

Something else to consider: What is the argument that Scott was wrongly decided because the Court's approach to video was wrong?

Preliminary Exam

Regular type. Large type.

Ten multiple-choice questions, worth five points each.

Due in class next Thursday, March 20.

For Friday

Wednesday audio--Section A, Section B.

    • Essay # 5 due in class Friday. Please  note the typo correction on Essay # 5--Defendant concedes the Plaintiff made a mistake. Again, it should not affect your essay.

    • Prelim Exam posted at 9 a.m. tomorrow. Instructions are up.

    • Section B meets at noon Friday; Section meets at 2 p.m. Friday. We will go an extra 20 minutes.

We will continue our conversation about finding the appropriate sanction, given the options in FRCP 37(b)(2)(A) (as incorporated).

We will spend much of Friday on Coca Cola:

Coca Cola Bottling Co. (Bottling) contracts with Coca Cola Co. (Coca) to bottle Coca Cola. Coca sends pre-mixed syrup to the bottler; the bottler mixes the syrup with carbonated water, bottles it, and ships it. The contract sets a price at which Bottler purchases syrup for "Coca Cola." The formula for Coca Cola is among the best-kept trade secrets in American business, particularly the composition of the mystery ingredient known as "Merchandise 7X." Two  people in the company at any time know the forumla for Merchandise 7X. The written formula is locked in a bank vault that can be opened only on resolution of the company Board of Directors (which requires a meeting and a vote, which takes some time but is not burdensome).

    Coca introduces "New Coke" and "Diet Coke" as new products. The secret ingredient in those products is "7X-100." As with 7X, two people in the company know the 7X-100 formula, the written formula is locked in a vault and opening the vault requires a resolution of the Board of Directors. Coca sells the syrup for New Coke and Diet Coke to Bottler, but at a substantially higher price than the contract price.

    Bottler sues Coca for breach of contract, arguing that Coca must sell New Coke and Diet Coke syrup at the contract price for Coca Cola. Bottler seeks to obtain discovery of the formulae for Merchandise 7X and 7X-100; Coca does not want to turn this information over.

    Be prepared to litigate for both sides:

        • Was Coca required to disclose under 26(a)?

        • How can Bottler seek the formula and how can Coca resist?

        • Must the formulae be provided and on what terms?

        • What can Coca do if the court orders it to provide it? What can the court do in response?

        • How might the FRCP 26(f) discovery conference eliminate much of this dispute?

We then move, time permitting to Summary Judgment: Standards and Procedures. Prep everything assigned.

    • What is the connection between discovery and summary judgment?

    • How does summary judgment differ from 12(b)(6) and 12(c)? What will the court consider on a motion for summary judgment? What is a stipulation?

    • What is an affidavit or declaration (and how are they different)? How else can a party preview a witness' testimony besides an affidavit or declaration? What is the difference and when will the party choose one or the other?

    • Break down the elements of FRCP 26(a) and the meaning of each key term. Think of how these terms apply in Scott, Adickes, and Celotex. How does the court decide each of these terms without acting as factfinder?

Note that Salazar-Limon is not a case to read but another problem that I will give you on the blog next week.

Essay # 5 (Both Sections) Clarification

In the Defendant's Motion, it should read that she concedes that Plaintiff made a mistake. Does not affect your answer in any way. Corrected versions attached.

Download Regular Type; Download Large Type. This one is too large and has too many pieces to post here. Due in class on Friday, March 14.

My apologies for not posting this as planned.

Preliminary Exam Instructions

Regular type; large type; and after the jump. It will post at 9 a.m. Thursday, March 13.

For Wednesday

Friday audio--Section B (Section A didn't record--don't worry, same material).

Upcoming key dates:

    • No class next Thursday.

    • Essay # 4 due on Wednesday.

    • Essay # 5 due on Friday.

    • Prelim Exam posted on Thursday; due on March 20.

    • Essay # 6 will post on Thursday, March 20.

Review both sections of Discovery--everything we have looked at so far, plus FRCP 37 and 45 and Seattle Times. 

    • Where does the obligation for parties to comply with discovery rules come from? What about non-parties?

    • How does the exchange of information work? What does each party do? When and how does the court become involved?

    • What is the mechanism for enforcing discovery obligations?  What sanctions are available and how does the court decide on a sanction? Note the special treatment for sanctions for violation FRCP 35 and 45.

I hope to get to Coca Cola by late Wednesday; if not, this will be our focus on Friday.

    Coca Cola Bottling Co. (Bottling) contracts with Coca Cola Co. (Coca) to bottle Coca Cola. Coca sends pre-mixed syrup to the bottler; the bottler mixes the syrup with carbonated water, bottles it, and ships it. The contract sets a price at which Bottler purchases syrup for "Coca Cola." The formula for Coca Cola is among the best-kept trade secrets in American business, particularly the composition of the mystery ingredient known as "Merchandise 7X." Two  people in the company at any time know the forumla for Merchandise 7X. The written formula is locked in a bank vault that can be opened only on resolution of the company Board of Directors (which requires a meeting and a vote, which takes some time but is not burdensome).

    Coca introduces "New Coke" and "Diet Coke" as new products. The secret ingredient in those products is "7X-100." As with 7X, two people in the company know the 7X-100 formula, the written formula is locked in a vault and opening the vault requires a resolution of the Board of Directors. Coca sells the syrup for New Coke and Diet Coke to Bottler, but at a substantially higher price than the contract price.

    Bottler sues Coca for breach of contract, arguing that Coca must sell New Coke and Diet Coke syrup at the contract price for Coca Cola. Bottler seeks to obtain discovery of the formulae for Merchandise 7X and 7X-100; Coca does not want to turn this information over.

    Be prepared to litigate for both sides:

        • Was Coca required to disclose under 26(a)?

        • How can Bottler seek the formula and how can Coca resist?

        • Must the formulae be provided and on what terms?

        • What can Coca do if the court orders it to provide it? What can the court do in response?

 

For Friday

Thursday audio--Section A, Section B. Section A meets in RDB 1000. Only 70 minutes tomorrow.

We continue with Discovery Process; plus, read FRCP 45 in addition to reviewing everything else.

Here, here, and here are some sample discovery documents, just to give you a picture of how they look and sound.

    • Why have the proportionality requirement in Rule 26(b)(1)? How does FRCP 26(b)(2) relate to 26(b)(1)?

    • Review the rules relating to the various discovery devices. Is there a particular order in which to use each device?

    • What is unique about FRCP 35 compared with other rules? What does Schlagenhauf tell about the scope and meaning of FRCP 35?

    • Where does the obligation for parties to comply with discovery rules come from? What about non-parties?

We will not get to Coca Cola until Wednesday of next week, but reminder of the problem. 

    Coca Cola Bottling Co. (Bottling) contracts with Coca Cola Co. (Coca) to bottle Coca Cola. Coca sends pre-mixed syrup to the bottler; the bottler mixes the syrup with carbonated water, bottles it, and ships it. The contract sets a price at which Bottler purchases syrup for "Coca Cola." The formula for Coca Cola is among the best-kept trade secrets in American business, particularly the composition of the mystery ingredient known as "Merchandise 7X." Two  people in the company at any time know the forumla for Merchandise 7X. The written formula is locked in a bank vault that can be opened only on resolution of the company Board of Directors (which requires a meeting and a vote, which takes some time but is not burdensome).

    Coca introduces "New Coke" and "Diet Coke" as new products. The secret ingredient in those products is "7X-100." As with 7X, two people in the company know the 7X-100 formula, the written formula is locked in a vault and opening the vault requires a resolution of the Board of Directors. Coca sells the syrup for New Coke and Diet Coke to Bottler, but at a substantially higher price than the contract price.

    Bottler sues Coca for breach of contract, arguing that Coca must sell New Coke and Diet Coke syrup at the contract price for Coca Cola. Bottler seeks to obtain discovery of the formulae for Merchandise 7X and 7X-100; Coca does not want to turn this information over.

    Be prepared to litigate for both sides:

        • Was Coca required to disclose under 26(a)?

        • How can Bottler seek the formula and how can Coca resist?

        • Must the formulae be provided and on what terms?

        • What can Coca do if the court orders it to provide it? What can the court do in response?

 

For Thursday

Wednesday audio--Section A, Section B. Essay # 4 posted today and is due next Wednesday. Essay # 5 will post at 12:30 tomorrow and is due outside my office next Thursday. Prelim Examn will post next Thursday and is due in class on Thursday,  March 20.

Quick point on the role of the 4(m) period in FRCP 15(c): The issue is the period of time, not service. The plaintiff must serve the original complaint on any properly named defendants; that is what 4(m) is about. Rule 15(c) is concerned with whether the amendment will relate back; it uses the 4(m) period as the period in which the to-be-added defendant must have received any notice. So in analyzing whether a pleading relates back, the question is "did the to-be-added defendant receive the notice required by (C)(i) and (ii) within the 4(m) period (whatever days that entails."

Also, on suing early in John Doe cases: The point was to explore the plaintiff's strategy in dealing with the fact that lack of notice is not a mistake so you can't relate a Doe pleading back. If you know you must sue Doe and you can't relate back, what can you do in your lawsuit that will allow you to identify Doe and amend? This is independent of the ability to sue anyone else (such as the City); any claim against the city is separate from the claim I want to bring against the officer once I learn his name and amend.

We turn to Managerial Judging, then Discovery Process for tomorrow; prep all of that for the next two days.

    • What is managerial judging and how does FRCP 16 contribute to that? What does FRCP 16 require or allow the judge to do?

    • How does discovery square with the adversary system? How does adverseness work into discovery? How do parties protect their interests within discovery? Consider the example of making and responding to document requests under Rule 34 and objecting in a deposition. How might you, as plaintiff, frame a document request in Godin or in Morgan.

    • What is the connection between discovery and notice pleading? If we think the discovery process is out of control, how might we control it?

    • What is disclosure and what is the standard for disclosure? How is that different than the ordinary standard for what is discoverable? Why a different standard for disclosure?

    • Why have the proportionality requirement in Rule 26(b)(1)? How does FRCP 26(b)(2) relate to 26(b)(1)?

    • Review the rules relating to the various discovery devices. Is there a particular order in which to use each device?

    • What is unique about FRCP 35 compared with other rules? What does Schlagenhauf tell about the scope and meaning of FRCP 35?

    • Where does the obligation for parties to comply with discovery rules come from? What about non-parties?

    • What is the process for seeking, obtaining, and responding to discovery? When and how does the court become involved? How does the court ensure compliance?

We will cap-off the discussion of Discovery with Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca Cola Co. (You probably cannot fully analyze the problem until we get through this week's materials, but you have it ready to go). Keep this on the back burner:

    Coca Cola Bottling Co. (Bottling) contracts with Coca Cola Co. (Coca) to bottle Coca Cola. Coca sends pre-mixed syrup to the bottler; the bottler mixes the syrup with carbonated water, bottles it, and ships it. The contract sets a price at which Bottler purchases syrup for "Coca Cola." The formula for Coca Cola is among the best-kept trade secrets in American business, particularly the composition of the mystery ingredient known as "Merchandise 7X." Two  people in the company at any time know the forumla for Merchandise 7X. The written formula is locked in a bank vault that can be opened only on resolution of the company Board of Directors (which requires a meeting and a vote, which takes some time but is not burdensome).

    Coca introduces "New Coke" and "Diet Coke" as new products. The secret ingredient in those products is "7X-100." As with 7X, two people in the company know the 7X-100 formula, the written formula is locked in a vault and opening the vault requires a resolution of the Board of Directors. Coca sells the syrup for New Coke and Diet Coke to Bottler, but at a substantially higher price than the contract price.

    Bottler sues Coca for breach of contract, arguing that Coca must sell New Coke and Diet Coke syrup at the contract price for Coca Cola. Bottler seeks to obtain discovery of the formulae for Merchandise 7X and 7X-100; Coca does not want to turn this information over.

    Be prepared to litigate for both sides:

        • Was Coca required to disclose under 26(a)?

        • How can Bottler seek the formula and how can Coca resist?

        • Must the formulae be provided and on what terms?

        • What can Coca do if the court orders it to provide it? What can the court do in response?

Essay # 4 (Sec. B)

Download Regular Print; Download Large Print. Read after the jump. Due in class next Wednesday, March 12.

Essay # 4 (Sec. A)

Download Regular Type; Download Large Type. Read after jump. Due in class next Wednesday, March 12.

Welcome Back: Essays and Upcoming

Welcome Back:

Graded Essay # 3 available outside my office (both sections).

Scores on Essay # 3:

    Section B: Mean:16.25; Median: 16 

    Section A: Mean: 17.75; Median: 17

Essay # 4 will post at 12:30 p.m. on Wednesday, March 5, due in class on Wednesday, March 12.

Essay # 5 will post at 12:30 p.m. on Thursday, March 6, due outside my office by the beginning of class time on Thursday, March 13 (remember no class that day).

Prelim Exam will post at 9 a.m. on Thursday, March 13 (our off-day), due in class on Thursday, March 20. The exam will consist of ten (10) questions, worth five (5) points each, for a total of fifty (50) points towards your final grade.

Comments on Essay # 3:

    • Read and answer the precise question as framed in the problem. If the problem narrows the issues, stay within those issues. You only have 1000 words, so I try to frame the problem to allow you to target a specific issue within that word limit; take advantage of it.

        • Section A: The motion conceded that Murray acted in a racist matter (a big concession, because one might describe this as national-origin discrimination, which § 1981 does not cover). You had no reasons to analyze that question; acknowledge the concession and focus on the other elements.

        • Section B: The motion only challenged the element of harm/damages. You had no reason to discuss whether Baffert owed a duty or acted negligently and no reason to discuss whether plaintiffs and Churchill Downs had a contract. The motion accepted all of that. Which a defendant might do--if the damages the plaintiffs seek are obviously unavailable as a matter of law, there may be no reason to get into a fight about duty at this point. Especially for purposes of dismissal with or without prejudice--if the allegations of duty are lacking but the court might allow plaintiffs to amend, a defendant might focus on allegations damages which are deficient as a legal matter and thus the basis for dismissing with prejudice.

    • Define important terms as part of your RE. What does legal insufficiency mean (and how does it relate to plausibility); what does factual insufficiency (and how does it relate to plausibility)? What does it mean to dismiss with or without prejudice? And explain your conclusions as part of your A--Why should the dismissal be with prejudice? This requires you to be specific and cite the allegations in the Complaint you are talking about. Don't talk in generalities.

    • If you identify a conclusory allegation, you can't say "this is conclusory" and stop. Because there may be other nonconclusory facts in the complaint that may establish a sufficient claim; you have to discuss them, as well.

Local Rules and Judges' Rules (Updated)

Recall FRCP 83(b), authorizing each judge to create procedural rules for practice in her courtroom, within (and consistent with) the FRCP and the rules of the district.

Six Judges on the District of Colorado adopted a joint set of Uniform Civil Practice Standards for their courtrooms. One of them, Judge Kato Crews, is presiding over a lawsuit challenging the Mountain West Conference's policy allowing trans women to participate in women's sports (there was a big controversy last season about a volleyball player at Colorado State). Plaintiffs have moved to recuse Judge Crews, arguing that his adoption of these courtroom policies reflects bias and prejudgment on the issues. (Update: Judge Crews refused to recuse or to rescind the policy).

At the same time, plaintiffs challenging programs to benefit historically underrepresented groups (such as corporate pipeline programs or minority-investment programs) have had more success recusing judges over policies encouraging courtroom participation by less-experienced attorneys, especially women and historically disadvantaged groups.

The moral: Do not assume that the local and courtroom rules enacted under FRCP 83 are anodyne or blandly apolitical. Sometimes they have a substantive effect.

Some things on FRCP 15(a)

1) What we tried to identify with both time periods  in FRCP 15(a)(1) is when the window opens (earliest the party can amend as a matter of course) and when the window closes (party no longer can amend as a matter of course). The party can amend at any time within that window. So a plaintiff who wants to amend the complaint can do so at any time from right after filing the original through service of the original through service of the response through 21 more days. She not wait until the response is filed (although in practice she might, because she does not know of the defects until the response comes). If she identifies defects herself, she need not wait for anything.

2) Someone asked the following question outside of class: Which FRCP 15(a)(1) time period applies to an Answer with a counterclaim? Is it (B), because the counterclaim makes this a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required? Or do we divide the pleading up--(A) controls the parts that do not require a responsive pleading (e.g., the answers to the allegations) and (B) controls the parts that do require a responsive pleading (e.g., the counterclaim).

I took the question to a Civ Pro Prof Listserv (that is a group that knows how to party). Most said the textual argument is (B) controls all, since the "pleading" means the entire document, which is one to which a responsive pleading is required because of the counterclaim.

3) One person responded with the following, which I think illustrates something about both of the above points. And it shows how much of what happens in litigation occurs in the shadow of the rules but plays out in very practical terms . And it shows how the judge enforces cooperation and practical action within the litigation:

This actually happened to me, sorta.  I filed an answer and a counterclaim and the next day I noticed that I had left off an exhibit relevant to the counterclaim so (this was in the days of paper filing) I walked over to the clerk’s office and I got the same clerk.  We were on friendly terms because I liked to file stuff myself.  The federal courthouse was right across the street and I liked the fresh air (and didn’t bill anyone for the time it took).  She said “why are you back again?”  I sheepishly explained what had happened.  She said “hold on, it was late yesterday and I didn’t have time to put it in the file,” so she took the missing exhibit stapled it to my first filing and put it in the file.  I hustled back to the office and snatched the amended answer/counterclaim that I was serving by mail out of the outgoing mail before it had been picked up.

My thought process was that since the other side was going to have to answer the counterclaim I had a freebie coming.  I didn’t give any thought to whether the fact that the exhibit was only relevant to the counterclaim made any difference or not.  I suppose I’d read the rule that the freebie would only apply to the counterclaim.

But realistically, nobody would have made an issue out of it.  My plan had been to call opposing counsel and tell them to ignore the original and just deal with the amended one.  The chances of them making a motion saying I needed permission from them or the court were vanishingly small and even if they did the judge would’ve looked at them cross-eyed and granted me permission to file an amended answer/counterclaim.

So I think that’s probably the closest to a real world answer.  But good on your student for reading the rule carefully enough spot an at least potential ambiguity.