Essay # 5 available outside my office.
Section A: Median: 10.5; Mean: 10.125
Section B: Median: 17.5; Mean: 18
Comments:
• Even if the facts seem simple, you must mention them in giving your conclusion. You cannot just say "The amendment is untimely." You must give the facts (date of filing, date of event, length of SL) showing why it is untimely. Note how the sample provides facts--even in a short sentence. Similarly, you must provide the facts (even if simple) about why you are looking to a particular rule--a sentence on how this amendment changes the naming of the party as a reason to apply 15(c)(1)(C). Don't assume away something just because you think it is obvious or simple.
• It is true that an employee often gets notice from conversations with her employer/supervisor But only if you have facts showing that conversation, which you do not have here. Employment (absent something like shared counsel) is not enough to impute knowledge and our class discussions did not give this as an example. Especially since Walton did not work for PICC at the time of the lawsuit.
• Too much working from notes rather than the text in stating the rule. That showed for those who read 15(c)(1)(C) to require service within the 4(m) period, as opposed to requiring notice (in whatever form) in that period.
• Rule 15(c)(1)(C) references the 4(m) service period as the time for the to-be-added party to receive notice. Why does that include the extension the court granted rather than just the original 90 days? This is the crux of the problem.
The court should deny the Motion to Strike and the Motion to Dismiss. The Amended Complaint was properly filed without leave and the claim in the Amended Complaint relates back to the timely date of the original pleading.
Motion to Strike
The Amended Complaint is properly filed as a matter of course, meaning as a matter of right. FRCP 15(a)(1). Where a pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required (because it states a claim for relief), the pleading party can amend once as a matter of course no later than 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or of a motion under FRCP 12 (b), (e), or (f). FRCP 15(a)(1)(B). In all other cases, amended requires consent of the opposing party or leave of court. FRCP 15(a)(2).
Moore has not amended as a matter of course prior to the current pleading. A Complaint states a claim for relief and thus is one to which a responsive pleading is required. Moore filed the original Complaint on June 12, 2024; the plaintiff therefore could amend as a matter of course anytime from June 12 (when he filed) through 21 days after service of the responsive pleading . But Walton never responded to the original pleading by responsive pleading or motion, as Moore had difficulty effecting service. The 21-day period never began to run, allowing Moore to amend at any time, including three months after the original.
Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim is subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year personal-injury limitations period. Wilson (1985); § 5524(2). The events occurred on September 16-17, 2022 and the limitations period lapsed on September 17, 2024. Plaintiff timely filed the original Complaint on June 12, 2024; it filed the Amended Complaint on September 19, 2024, two days after the limitations period lapsed.
An amended pleading is not untimely when it relates back to the date of the original pleading—the court treats the claim in the amended pleading as if included in the timely filed original. FRCP 15(c). FRCP 15(c)(1)(C) controls where the amended pleading changes “the naming of the party” by altering how an existing party is identified in the pleading. Moore’s Amended Complaint does this—changing “C.O. Walden” to “C.O. Saajida Walton,” while referring to the same person.
Under FRCP 15(c)(1)(C), the claim in the new pleading must arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out in the original pleading. FRCP 15(c)(1)(B). Within “the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint,” the party whose name is changed must have “received notice of the action such that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits” and “knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” FRCP 15(c)(1)(C)(i)-(ii).
Walton’s motion concedes that the Amended Complaint arises from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original complaint; she will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and she was not properly named in the original Complaint due to a mistake concerning her identity. The motion therefore turns on whether she received appropriate and timely notice.
The newly named defendant must receive notice of the action and know the action would have been brought against it. It must have notice that the lawsuit was filed, its subject matter and basic facts, and that the party was an actual or potential target. Notice can be actual (the new party knows of the action) or imputed (the new party is deemed to know because someone else knows. Actual notice includes formal service of the original or amended pleading on the party. Walton received formal notice of the action and her place in it—she was personally served with the Amended Complaint containing her correct name as defendant in the caption and describing her conduct that injured Moore.
Notice must be timely—received “within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint.” FRCP 4(m) requires service “within 90 days after the complaint is filed.” If the plaintiff fails to serve within that time, the court must dismiss the action without prejudice or order that service be made within a specified time. The court must extend time for “an appropriate period” if the plaintiff shows “good cause for the failure to serve.” FRCP 4(m).
Plaintiff served the Amended Complaint on Walton on October 2. The 90-day period for serving the original Complaint expired on September 9, 2024, 23 days earlier. But the court’s September 7 Order found good cause for the failure to serve and extended the service period by an additional 92 days. Relation back thus turns on whether “the period provided by Rule 4(m)” for providing notice in FRCP 15(c)(1)(C) includes extensions of the service time.
The text of FRCP 15(c)(1)(C) supports that interpretation. The rule does not say the party must receive notice within 90 days of serving the prior Complaint; had the Committee intended to require service only within that original period, it would have said so. Instead, FRCP 15(c)(1)(C) references and incorporates Rule 4(m) and thus the entire Rule 4(m) period—the original 90 days plus any extensions for “specified” or “appropriate” periods the court might grant in the case.
The Advisory Committee supports that interpretation. The 1991 amendment linked the Rule 15(c) notice period to the 4(m) service period. The ACN states that “[i]n allowing a name-correcting amendment within the time allowed by Rule 4(m), this rule allows not only” the time specified in FRCP 4(m), “but also any additional time resulting from any extension ordered by the court pursuant to that rule, as may be granted.” (ACN 1991 amendment).
This interpretation furthers the purpose of linking notice and the service period. The Committee sought to ensure that the new or newly named defendant receives notice in the same period as if properly named in the timely original. Had the new or newly named defendant been properly identified in the timely original Complaint, she would have been served (and received notice) within the full 4(m) period—90 days from filing plus any extension granted.
The best reading of FRCP 15(c)(1)(C) requires notice within 90 days of service of the original complaint plus any judicially authorized extensions. The “period provided by Rule 4(m)” includes the original 90 days plus the additional 92 days the court granted in its September 7 Order; the service period did not expire until December 10, 2024. Plaintiff served Defendant with the Amended Complaint on October 2, more than two months prior to that end date. That formal service gave Walton notice of the action and that she is a target of the action within the 4(m) service period.
