Friday audio: Section B, Part I; Section B, Part II. Section A, Part I; Section A, Part II.
Essay # 1 will post on Wednesday.
Complete The Future of Federal Pleading. With respect to the idea of "obvious alternative explanations," consider what the Court said in NRA v. Vullo:
The NRA sued a NY state official for a First Amendment violation, alleging that the official had threatened to investigate (or drop investigations against) insurance companies if they stopped providing services to the NRA. The official argued that an "obvious alternative explanation" for these actions was pursuing violations of state law and the ordinary give-and-take of negotiation between government and targets of an investigation. At pp. 16-17, the Court said this:
[T]his Court cannot simply credit Vullo’s assertion that “pursuing conceded violations of the law,” Brief for Respondent 29, is an “ ‘obvious alternative explanation’ ” for her actions that defeats the plausibility of any coercive threat raising First Amendment concerns, id., at 37, 40, 42 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U. S., at 682). Of course, discovery in this case might show that the allegations of coercion are false, or that certain actions should be understood differently in light of newly disclosed evidence. At this stage, though, the Court must assume the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are true.
