Graded papers available outside my office.
Median: 23.25
Mean: 23
High: 35
Sample answer after the jump.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint should be granted.
Constitutional claims are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal-injury tort claims for the state in which the district court sits. § 1988(a). Kentucky establishes a one-year limitation for such actions. Ky. Stat. § 413.140. The home search occurred on May 7, 2024. Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint on September 7, 2025, more than one year later.
An amended pleading is not untimely when it relates back to the date of the original pleading—the court treats the claims within the amended pleading as if they were included in the timely original. FRCP 15(c). Plaintiff commenced this action on May 6, 2025, one day before the statute lapsed. The claims against the movants would have been timely if included in that pleading.
The FAC “changes the party” against whom a claim is asserted by adding the individual officers (the movants on this motion) as new defendants. (FAC ¶¶ 4-6). FRCP 15(c)(1)(C) therefore controls relation back.
The claims in the new pleading must arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out in the original pleading. FRCP 15(c)(1)(C); FRCP 15(c)(1)(B). Within FRCP 4(m)’s service period (90 days from filing the original complaint), the new party must “receive[] notice of the action such that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits,” FRCP 15(c)(1)(C)(i), and “knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” FRCP 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).
The court considers each element.
Same Conduct, Transaction, or Occurrence
The claims against the movants in the FAC arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as those in the original Complaint—the early-morning May 7, 2024 warrantless entry into plaintiffs’ home at 1732 Columbia Street, Louisville. The FAC adds allegations identifying the new defendants (FAC ¶¶ 4-6), but the paragraphs describing the underlying search remain unchanged. (FAC ¶¶ 11-14).
Notice and Knowledge
The newly named defendant must, within 90 days of the filing of the original Complaint, receive notice of the action (FRCP 15(c)(1)(C)(i)) and know the action would have been brought against it (FRCP 15(c)(1)(C)(ii)). Together, they require notice that the action was filed; the subject matter, basic facts, and underlying events giving rise to the action; and that the new defendants were actual or potential targets of the lawsuit.
Movants must have received notice by August 4, 2025. On July 25, 2025—10 days prior—Sgt. Kyle Seng of the Louisville Metro Police Department, the supervising officers for the movants, met with the moving defendants in his office at the precinct station. Also present was David Eades, an attorney with the Law Department of the Louisville Metro Government. During that meeting, Sgt. Seng informed movants that a lawsuit arising from the early-morning May 7, 2024 search at 1732 Columbia Street had been filed, alleging that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. Seng showed each movant a copy of the complaint. And each acknowledged their involvement in the search. This satisfies FRCP 15(c)(1)(C)(i)—they received notice of the action and the subject of the action.
But it cannot satisfy FRCP 15(c)(1)(C)(ii)—knowledge that they are targets of the action. The Complaint named Louisville Metro Government as the sole defendant and describes its failure to train or supervise its officers as the culpable conduct causing the violation. Nothing in the Complaint indicates that plaintiffs wanted to bring claims against anyone other than Louisville or a theory other than failure-to-train. Nothing indicates plaintiffs intended or wanted to bring claims against the individual officers involved in the search.
Absence of Prejudice
The new party must suffer unique disadvantage resulting from the untimely filing; that is, prejudice he would not have suffered had he been named properly in the timely original. This is the prejudice from the defendant reposing following the end of the limitations period and failing to preserve evidence and prepare to defend himself.
The record does not reveal prejudice. The FAC was filed about three months after the limitations period expired, concededly not a substantial period.
Mistake
The failure to include the movants in the original pleading must result from a “mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 and 1991 amendments to FRCP 15 define mistake as “misnomer or misidentification,” where the plaintiff calls the correct person or entity by the wrong name. Krupski extends mistake to include any “’error, misconception, or misunderstanding;” an “erroneous belief;” or “a wrong action or statement proceeding from faulty judgment, inadequate knowledge, or inattention.”
This case turns on why plaintiffs did not name movants in the original Complaint. Logic suggests two possible reasons.
First, they made a strategic decision to seek a remedy only from Louisville on a failure-to-train-or-supervise theory and to forego claims against individual officers. Such deliberate litigation choices or strategies do not constitute mistakes. Krupski.
Alternatively, they did not know the officers’ names. The FAC suggests that possibility by alleging that the officers did not identify themselves and that events on May 7 moved too quickly for plaintiffs to record their names or badge numbers. (FAC ¶ 12). And the FAC concedes that plaintiffs learned the names after filing the action. (FAC ¶¶ 4-6).
Under Zakora (6th Cir. 2025), however, lack of knowledge of a party’s identity does not constitute mistake for FRCP 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). Zakura adopted and incorporated the Seventh Circuit approach in Herrera (7th Cir. 2021).
Herrera involved a plaintiff who sued a John Doe placeholder, then sought to amend to identify him by his proper name. The court held that the plaintiff was not mistaken as to the defendant’s name. Rather, he did not know the defendant’s name. Plaintiffs made a deliberate, intentional, informed decision to sue Doe on account of their lack of knowledge. Rather than a mistake, naming a Doe defendant reflects the proper action to overcome lack of knowledge of the defendant’s name.
The instant case is distinct from Zakura (and Herrera) because the plaintiffs did not sue John Doe and then attempt to change the naming upon learning their names. Instead, they named no individual officers under any names. But the principal controls. Plaintiffs who make intentional litigation decisions because they lack knowledge about a potential party’s identity do not make a mistake. They know they do not know the proper party’s identity and make appropriate deliberate choices. Neither counts as a mistake.
