The motion to dismiss for improper venue is denied.
Defendant has not waived her FRCP 12(b)(3) defense. A party may consolidate all Rule 12 defenses in a single motion, FRCP 12(g)(1), and does not waive any 12(b) defense by including it with another 12(b) defense. This includes the defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction (FRCP 12(b)(2)) and improper venue (FRCP 12(b)(3)). Both are “disfavored” defenses, waived if not raised in the defendant’s first-filed motion or responsive pleading. FRCP 12(h)(1)(B)(ii). Had defendant raised the FRCP 12(b)(2) defense in a stand-alone motion, she would have waived her improper-venue defense. In fact, the rules require defendant to do what she did here—assert them in one motion.
Venue is the “geographic specification of the proper court or courts for the litigation of a civil action that is within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district courts.” § 1390(a). A civil action is properly in federal court; venue determines which of the 94 federal districts can hear the case. Congress defines proper venue, based on its determination of efficiency and the proper division of workload in the federal courts.
Section 1391 governs venue for civil actions unless a different statute governs a particular case. § 1391(a)(1). Venue is proper in: 1) a district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the state in which the district is located; 2) a district in which a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred;” and 3) any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction, if there is no other district in which the action could be brought. § 1391(b). Venue may be proper in multiple districts; the question on a 12(b)(3) motion is whether the district in which the action is pending is proper.
Defendant Residence:
Venue is proper in a district in which any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the state in which the district is located. § 1391(b)(1). A natural person resides for (b)(1) purposes in the district of her domicile. § 1391(c)(1). Domicile is a person’s true, fixed permanent home and principal establishment and the place she intends to remain and to return when she goes away. Mas. Because Griffin is the sole defendant, (b)(1) turns on whether she resides in this district. Griffin’s domicile is California, where she has lived for more than 40 years, where she owns a home, and to which she returns from her many comedy tours. (¶ 6). California is not located in the Western District of Tennessee, where the action is pending. Venue thus is not proper under (b)(1).
Events or Omissions
Venue is proper in a district in which a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” § 1391(b)(2). This does not require all or a majority of events or omissions to occur in the forum district; only a substantial part. A substantial part of events may occur in multiple districts, meaning multiple districts may be proper. So long as a substantial part occurred in the forum, venue is proper.
A substantial part of the events occurred in the Western District of Tennessee. The precipitating event—Samuel’s video-recorded encounter with the teen—occurred in Franklin, TN, in the Western District. A Tennessee-based company fired Samuel in Tennessee, an element of plaintiff’s tortious interference claim. Defendant directed some of her tweets at VisuWell, a Tennessee company, questioning them about Samuel’s continued employment as CEO and membership on the Board of Directors and engaging in exchanges about the “measures” the company was taking in this district. This qualifies as a “substantial part” of the events. That other events occurred elsewhere—Griffin tweeted from her home outside of this district—does not reduce the amount that occurred in the forum district.
Safety Net
Section 1391(b)(3) offers a safety net—if “there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought,” venue is proper in any district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. The court can rely on (b)(3) only if the action could not be brought in any of the other 93 federal districts.
But venue would be proper in the Central District of California, where Griffin is domiciled. Venue is proper in the district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the state of that district. § 1391(b)(1). An individual resides in the district in which she is domiciled. § 1391(c)(1). Griffin is domiciled in California. More specifically, she is domiciled in Los Angeles County, California, located in the Central District of California. She therefore resides in the Central District, making it a proper venue for a claim against a single defendant. If venue is not proper in the Western District under § 1391(b)(2), plaintiffs could have brought this action in the Central District of California under § 1391(b)91). Because plaintiffs could bring the action in another district, they cannot rely on § 1391(b)(3) to establish venue in this district.
