Common Problem: Supreme Court decisions are not part of the transaction or occurrence; that looks to real-world events.
The court denies the motion to sever, as Deski and Maxwell are properly joined as defendants in Fund Texas Choice’s (“FTC”) action.
On motion, the court may drop a party who has been misjoined. FRCP 21. The instant motion urges this court to determine whether Deski and Maxwell were properly joined as defendants under FRCP 20(a)(2).
Persons may be joined as defendants in one action when rights to relief asserted against them arising out of the “same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” FRCP 20(a)(2)(A). Courts define same transaction or occurrence through the “Logical Relationship” Test--whether the essential facts giving rise to claims against each defendant are so logically connected that considerations of judicial economy and fairness dictate that the issues be resolved in one lawsuit. Jones. This requires a sufficient logical or rational connection between the real-world events giving rise to claims against each defendant, such that it is reasonable, fair, and efficient to resolve them as a single litigation unit. The claims must arise from the same real-world events; a but-for or sequential relationship between discrete events is not sufficient.
If FRCP 20(a)(2)(A) is satisfied, “any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.” FRCP 20(a)(2)(B). 20(a)(2) uses “and” between (A) and (B), meaning joinder requires the plaintiff satisfy both prongs.
Broad joinder of parties serves judicial efficiency by collecting related and overlapping parties and claims in one lawsuit. It eliminates multiple and duplicative litigation—including multiple and duplicative discovery—over the same real-world events, facts, witnesses, information, and evidence; a single round of discovery can gather all evidence from all witnesses on one set of events. It allows the court to accord complete justice in one action—providing an injured plaintiff complete recovery for his injury from all possible causes and properly allocating liability among all defendants. It also avoids the risk of inconsistent judgments in separate cases by allowing for one decisionmaker to make one decision as to the entire dispute.
Deski and Maxwell are properly joined in this action. FRCP 20(a)(2)(A) is satisfied because the claims against both defendants bear a logical relationship. They arise from FTC’s planned activities of providing financial, logistical, informational, emotional, and travel assistance to pregnant Texans seeking lawful reproductive services outside of Texas (¶¶ 21, 31) and its decision to cease engaging in those activities fearing enforcement of the challengd laws. (¶¶23, 36). Each defendant is responsible for and threatens to enforce a Texas law that prohibits those activities and whose enforcement allegedly violates FTC’s First Amendment rights and right to travel. (¶¶4, 37, 42-43, 67,60). Although Maxwell and Deski enforce different laws, both laws target FTC’s real-world conduct—supporting, enabling, and funding lawful out-of-state abortions. Were FTC to pursue its organizational mission and assist with an out-of-state abortion, it could face Deski-initiated criminal prosecution and Maxwell-initiated civil litigation.
FRCP 20(a)(2)(B) is satisfied. The claims against the defendants share common questions of law. Although each defendant enforces a different state law, FTC argues that both laws violate the same federal constitutional rights—the First Amendment freedom of speech and the right to travel. Claims against both parties require the court to resolve identical constitutional questions about the scope of these constitutional rights—whether they protect the right to pay for and support travel for lawful out-of-state abortions. The answer to those questions dictates whether each challenged law is constitutionally valid and thus whether the court should enjoin the defendants from enforcing those laws.
FRCP 20(a)(2)(B) requires a common question of law or a question of fact, not both; the presence of a question of law satisfies the rule. But there also are common questions of fact. For example, claims against both defendants raise questions about the nature of FTC’s activities—how much money it raises and spends, what it spends that money on, and whether the out-of-state abortions FTC funds are lawful in other states. Both claims also share the fact that FTC’s donors have ceased funding the organization. (¶¶ 24, 37).
Joinder serves FRCP 20’s efficiency goals. FTC seeks to engage in what it believes to be constitutionally protected conduct and it fears that it will be unable to engage in that conduct because they will be prosecuted by Deski and subject to civil suit by Maxwell. Joining the defendants allows this court to resolve the entire constitutional controversy over FTC’s planned actions, whether it enjoys a constitutional right to engage in those activities, and whether neither, one, or both laws violate those constitutional rights. The parties can employ one round of discovery gathering all relevant evidence about FTC’s conduct and one round of legal arguments to resolve identical constitutional questions about their conduct and the constitutional validity of these state laws.
