The court should deny defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6).
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal and factual sufficiency of a pleading stating a claim for relief. A court can dismiss with prejudice (with leave to replead) or without prejudice (with leave to replead).
A pleading asserting civil rights claims must comport with FRCP 8(a)(2); it is not subject to any heightened pleading standard. Johnson; Swierkiwicz. This requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FRCP 8(a)(2). A complaint must provide the defendant with “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly; Conley. Under Twombly, as affirmed in Iqbal, a complaint must contain sufficient nonconclusory factual matter to raise a right to relief that is “plausible on its face.” It must plead sufficient non-conclusory facts, taken as true, to plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Iqbal. The plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal. The allegations must show that relief is more than possible (that the defendant could have engaged in wrongdoing) although it need not be probable (more likely than not the defendant engaged in wrongdoing). Twombly. Labels, “bald” legal conclusions, and formulaic or threadbare recitations of the elements of a claim are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Iqbal. Non-conclusory allegations accepted as true must identify a real-world transaction or occurrence, describing specific action by specific individuals.
The court examines well-pleaded, non-conclusory facts, taken as true, and
whether they state a plausible claim for relief, given the elements of the
substantive law. Iqbal. This “context-specific task” requires the
“reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense” to decide
whether the plaintiff has plausibly alleged an entitlement to recovery. Iqbal;
Twombly. A plaintiff sufficiently pleads through direct factual
allegations and through factual allegations permitting reasonable inferences,
drawn in favor of the plaintiff, showing liability. NRA; Iqbal.
Section 1981 prohibits race discrimination in making and enforcing contracts. § 1981; Denny. To state a cause of action under § 1981, plaintiff must show 1) the defendant intentionally discriminated because of race; 2) the plaintiff had a contractual interest or relationship with defendant; and 3) the discrimination interfered with that interest.
Defendants concede the racially discriminatory nature of Murray’s actions. The issue is whether plaintiff plausibly pleaded a contractual relationship and interference with that relationship.
Contractual Interest
Plaintiff must allege the loss of an actual, not speculative or prospective, contract interest; this requires intent to purchase, even without physical possession of any item. Denny. The retail context requires a plaintiff seek to enter a contract, via “some tangible attempt to contract, by demonstrating interest in purchasing specific items or by selecting certain merchandise for purchase from defendant.” Williams.
Guerrero has plausibly alleged a contractual interest. He went to the store to purchase a pot (¶ 8), a fact he shared with Murray during their confrontation. (¶ 18). Guerrero had identified a pot he liked, wanted to find a second, matching one, and told his sister he found a matching one. (¶¶ 9, 11). He attempted to take possession of that matching pot by removing it from the pallet (¶¶ 11-12). Murray’s words and actions in wielding the knife stopped Guerrero from taking the pot. (¶ 14). Even after that initial exchange, Guerrero waited for Murray to remove the pots from the pallet so he could take the one he wanted. (¶ 16). These facts are non-conclusory—they describe real-world events without labels or conclusions. Taking them as true and drawing all reasonable inferences for the plaintiff, he has plausibly alleged that he would have taken two pots and purchased them from the store, until Murray’s (concededly) racially discriminatory actions stopped him from doing so.
Interference
To plead interference, plaintiff must allege that he was denied the opportunity to contract for goods or services. Comcast. This may include situations in which plaintiff leaves the store without making a purchase following discriminatory actions by one store employee, even where other employees are willing to help complete the purchase. Green.
That Guerrero left the store without making the purchase (¶ 27) does not undermine his claim. Murray plausibly alleged intent to purchase the pots. (¶ 8). Murry prevented Guerrero from doing so by waving the knife, which caused Guerrero to fear for his safety (¶14); ordering him to stand elsewhere and not touch the pots in the pallet (¶¶ 13, 17, 19); and shouting about stabbing or shooting him while wielding the knife. (¶¶ 21-23). As in Green, one employee interfered with Guerrero’s ability to purchase products, then Guerrero left the store rather than wait to see if some employee might help him complete the purchase. Guerrero describes Murray’s real-world actions. Taking these allegations as true and drawing all inferences in favor of Guerrero, he has plausibly shown that Murray interfered with his efforts to complete the purchase of the pots by stopping him from taking the pots. The court can draw the reasonable inference that Guerrero would have purchased the pots but did not because of Murray’s threats and, as in Green, anger over his mistreatment by Murray.
Context-Specific Task
Determining plausible is a “context-specific task,” Twiqbal, meaning the context of the litigation affects the analysis. Courts may relax the pleading requirements in cases arising from a different context, such as smaller, less-discovery-intensive cases. Twombly and Iqbal involved large, discovery-intensive actions, in which discovery would costly, time-consuming, and burdensome, interfering with government or a large section of the economy. This case involves a single dispute involving one plaintiff over events that occurred at one store. Guerrero knows many of the key facts (other than Murray’s racial motivation), thus discovery will not be uniquely time-consuming or interfering. In this smaller context, Guerrero’s allegations are sufficient to show a plausible entitlement to relief.
